# THE WRITING ON THE WALL

## THE NATION ON TRIAL

ERIC FISHER WOOD

Lest we forget how prophecies were fulfilled!

M.

Dec. 25/22

# THE WRITING ON THE WALL

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THE COLORS

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## THE NATION ON TRIAL

BY

ERIC FISHER WOOD

Author of "The Note Book of an Attaché"

ILLUSTRATED WITH
PHOTOGRAPHS AND MAPS

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## PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Mr. Wood is the author of "The Note-Book of an Attaché." He served under Mr. Herrick at the American Embassy in Paris during the first months of the war. He witnessed the mobilization of the armies of the French republic, and saw these armies in action along the Marne and the Aisne and before Calais.

Later he traveled as a bearer of despatches through England, Holland, Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Hungary. He has observed the French, British, Belgian and German troops in action, and in addition has seen the armies of Austria, Switzerland, Hungary and Holland on a war footing.

He has made a very thorough first hand study of the Swiss system of Na-

tional defense, both in peace time and upon a war footing.

His military knowledge is such that he has not only made detailed reports to the army war college in Washington, but has by request delivered lectures on his observations and conclusions to the general staff at Governor's Island and to the officers and cadets at West Point.

In "The Writing on the Wall" he acts as unofficial spokesman for our professional military authorities, who have much of vital importance to tell us about Military Preparedness but are prevented from speaking for themselves by a political censorship more rigorous than the military one now maintained in Europe.

# INTRODUCTION

I commit myself to the verdict that no civilian is competent to give decisions in military matters. It therefore becomes necessary to explain why I, a civilian, am hereby delivering myself of pronounced opinions on these same military subjects.

In giving reasons for the immediate and pressing need of preparedness to defeat any attack upon our country, I stand on my own recent experiences in Europe, and need no outside prompting. In my mind are scenes—terrible scenes which constantly pass across my mental vision—crying out their warnings for America.

When, however, we come to a discus-

sion of the *means* by which such preparation can best be accomplished, or by what method we may soonest protect ourselves, I am absolutely depending upon expert military opinion. While in Europe, during the first seven months of the great war, I diligently gathered in every country I visited, from every battle-field I studied, and from every army-officer I interviewed, all data or information which might bear upon the situation and needs of my own country. The conclusions drawn from these observations, and the plans outlined, were formulated only after the material which I had gathered had been submitted to the judgment of the army and navy authorities of the United States; only now that my opinions and conclusions have been modified, revised, and approved by our highest military ex-

perts do I feel justified in presenting them for public consideration.

Therefore, in outlining what seems to be the best method of military protection for our own country, I do not violate my own dictum that only military experts are competent to give advice in purely military matters, since I offer not my own opinion, but the verdict of competent army- and navy-officers whom regulations forbid to speak for themselves. None of us realizes our danger more absolutely than these experts; none would be more willing to instruct their countrymen; no others could be better fitted to show us our errors if they were not subjected to a censorship as rigorous as that which now prevails at the battle-front in Europe.

Our politicians, in order to protect themselves from the exposure of their

numerous administrative blunders, which they naturally commit when they attempt to perform duties for which they are utterly unqualified, have muzzled our officers, and thus the only men who are thoroughly competent to reveal the woeful inefficiencies of our army and navy are forced to keep silence. They are even compelled to bear the discredit for blunders for which they are in no way responsible, and from which they would protect us if they were allowed freedom of speech. Occasionally their devotion to their country impels them to risk everything and to break through this senseless barrier, thereby injuring the reputations and the political careers of some of our well-known "statesmen." The fate of Admiral Fiske, who recently, when questioned before a congressional committee, dared

to tell unpleasant truths about the present lack of organization in our navy, is the latest warning that indiscreet outbursts of truth and patriotism will promptly result in ruined careers. To muzzle our experts on national safety is almost as ridiculous as it would be to force the Doctors Mayo to keep silent on surgery, or to forbid Edison to speak about electricity.

# CONTENTS


| CHAPTER | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| I | REALITIES VERSUS FANCIES | 3 |
| II | PRECEDENTS VERSUS SOPHISTRIES | 27 |
| III | PREPARATIONISTS ARE PACIFISTS | 47 |
| IV | A WARNING AND AN EXAMPLE | 58 |
| V | ARMY REFORM | 74 |
| VI | THE SWISS SYSTEM | 86 |
| VII | EDUCATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY TRAINING | 97 |
| VIII | TEMPORARY EXPEDIENTS | 105 |
| IX | THE ESSENTIAL BASIS OF ARMY AND NAVY REFORMS | 112 |
| X | ESSENTIAL SUPPLEMENTARY REFORMS | 123 |
| XI | THE NATION ON TRIAL | 133 |
| | CONCLUSION | 148 |


## APPENDIX


PUBLIC OPINION ON PREPAREDNESS . . . . . 153

# LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS


The Colors . . . . *Frontispiece*

FACING PAGE

Comparative Map of Europe and the United States . . . . . 28

"The Vulnerable Heart of the United States" . . . . . 32

Congressman Augustus P. Gardner . 40

Congressman Claude Kitchin . . 41

Theodore Roosevelt . . . . . 72

William Jennings Bryan . . . 73

Dr. Lyman Abbott . . . . 88

Rear Admiral Fiske . . . . 120

Josephus Daniels . . . . . 121

President Emeritus Charles W. Eliot . 136

# THE WRITING ON THE WALL

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## CHAPTER I

### REALITIES VERSUS FANCIES

NO Americans are alive to-day who saw Washington burned and sacked in 1814, and few still live who dwelt in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864. The Americans of the present generation have passed their lives in quiet pastures and beside the still waters. It is difficult for them to picture what war and invasion really involve. They do not clearly distinguish between the war of history and romance and that other

war which is hell. They fail, for instance, to comprehend that it is *not* the soldier boy who suffers most in war time, but the women of an unprepared country who in the day of reckoning have no trained and organized bodies of men to defend them from the poverty and degradation which invariably exist in a conquered land.

The real agony of war is endured by the civil population of the defeated and invaded nation; beside that the suffering of the men who die in battle is as nothing. The suffering of the civil population stretches out beyond its own generation to future generations, robbed of their very birthright; it stretches out for twenty-five, fifty, even a hundred years, and is the penalty which a nation pays for being over-confident and unwilling to face facts.

With the exception of persons like myself whom chance has thrust amidst scenes of war in foreign countries, few living Americans have beheld the horrible reality with their own eyes; few have seen, and therefore few have understood. We who have worked in the ruined countries know what invasion means. We have seen the proud cities of yesterday to-day smoldering in ashes. We have seen nations of happy artisans and farmers reduced in a twinkling to a starving mob of dumb creatures whom Fate has robbed of all the fruits of a life of faithful toil. We have seen dear old white-haired men and women wandering cold, hungry, and penniless across a desolated land. We have seen refined women, the élite of a nation, insane with fear, pain, and sorrow. We have seen the counterpart

of every American woman we know, alone, unprotected, and hopeless, with the look of a hunted animal in her eyes.

Verily the supreme agony of war is not to be found on the march, in camp, nor upon the field of battle.

We who have beheld the present gigantic struggle with our own eyes feel and understand how far-reaching it is, and how much more far-reaching it may well become. When we return from Europe and find our countrymen apparently asleep to all this, we are utterly amazed at their apathy. We become possessed by an almost irrepressible impulse to shake them until they are thoroughly awake; we long to open their sleepy eyes to the full significance of such facts as that the casualties of the first year of this war are probably greater than the casualties of all the

other wars in the last thousand years; and that while in 1815, at the close of the last world war, the combined total of all the armies of the allies and of Napoleon numbered only 250,000 men, *the armies now embattled number more than one hundred times that many.*

That last world conflict eventually reached across the broad Atlantic to bring America the War of 1812 and the Louisiana Purchase. How soon may the present struggle spread across the now narrowed ocean, and what fate may *it* bring to America?

We who have beheld the very letters of the writing on the wall and have copied them down to bring to our fellow countrymen, are met with reserve. We are called jingoes, the one thing which men who have looked upon the actual face of war can never be. Having seen

the suddenness with which glowering war may burst in upon a tranquil nation, we are surprised to find Americans lacking in any stronger sentiments than a conventional disapproval of the violation of Belgium and an equally conventional pity for the sufferings of the soldier on the fighting line. We are chiefly impressed by the fact that modern wars are such complicated affairs that even latent power is valueless if it has not been organized in advance. We know that it is equally useless if it has been wrongly or inefficiently developed.

We know that the volunteer system by which armies are organized only after the beginning of hostilities is and always has been a total failure. We feel it to be significant that America's great men have ever opposed it even

since the very birth of the nation.

Washington inveighed against it; so did Hamilton and Monroe.

In 1790, Washington said, "In time of peace prepare for war."

Later, in the first year of his Presidency, when addressing a joint session of Congress, he cried, "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace."

Four years later, in his annual address, he said: "The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, *contrary to the order of human events,* they will forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms with which the history of every other nation abounds. There is a rank due to the United States among nations which will be withheld if not absolutely lost by the reputation of weakness. If we desire

to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; *if we desire to secure peace,* one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, *it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.*"

In 1787, Alexander Hamilton stated that "*the rights of neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an adequate power.*"

In 1822 James Monroe said, "The history of the late wars in Europe *furnished a complete demonstration* that no system of conduct, however correct in principle, can protect neutral powers from injury from any party; that *a defenseless position and distinguished love of peace are the surest invitations to war;* and that there is no way to avoid it, otherwise than being always prepared and willing, for just cause, to meet it."

Adequate military preparedness for the United States does not necessarily imply the possession of an increased standing army, but only of an efficient military system for defense. It may not entail for America a larger expenditure than is now devoted to the maintenance of our army. It does, however, require that what is spent shall be efficiently spent; it implies that our military budget must be laid out by the nation's competent military experts, and not by party politicians. It means that the safety of the nation must no longer be a prey to the vagaries and idiosyncrasies of political theorists and charlatans.

The citizens of other great countries do not permit their politicians to juggle and traffic with the national safety. Among the nations of the earth we are

almost the only one which still allows laymen almost entirely to manage the expenditures of the moneys devoted to national defense. In consequence our ineffective standing army now costs us $100,000,000 a year, but can put into the field to protect our land fewer than 50,000 men. The efficient Swiss system of military preparedness, which is run by trained military experts, costs only $8,000,000 a year in peace time, and yet can promptly put into the field a compact army of more than 400,000 trained soldiers. This comparison shows that *it costs the United States one hundred times more per year for each man available to repel invasion than it does Switzerland.*

My various observations and experiences in the war zone have led me to a conclusion that is concurred in by each

and every American who has had opportunity to study the appalling conditions now prevailing in Europe, which is that the only rational insurance against unprovoked attack is adequate military preparedness. Among the most ardent of its advocates whom I have interviewed since the war's beginning are Americans who had journeyed to Switzerland as delegates to an international peace conference, and were there caught by the sudden outbreak of hostilities. They could not fail to perceive that adequate military preparedness, and that alone, had saved Switzerland from war. They still demand peace, but they now demand it at the price of preparedness.

There are very strong arguments against our possessing a large standing army, but there is no valid argument

against adequate military preparedness. In this country those who do not demand better preparation for national defense have either not had sufficient opportunity to study the matter, or they suffer from a mental blind spot—a blind spot like that which renders the habitual criminal incapable of seeing that crime does not pay.

The nations of the earth have entered upon a political era of cold-blooded aggression wherein burglary and violation are ordinary proceedings and wherein the individual nations are acting with brutal selfishness. Each works solely for its own interest, and without the least consideration for the interests of others.

Germany's violation of Belgium is, alas! only typical of this era. It has

become notorious in the eyes of America because Germany happens to be the nation which gave the first and most spectacular demonstration of the modern political immorality. In the more recent months of the war neither Great Britain nor Russia has shown any respect for neutrality. On January 19th, 1916, the King of Greece said publicly: "It is the merest cant for Great Britain and France to talk about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg after what they themselves have done here [in Greece]."

It has many times been shown that any great nation will unhesitatingly violate the neutrality of a country which is unprepared vigorously to defend herself. Even the United States did not arbitrate with Colombia over Panama; nor did our forefathers ar-

bitrate with the American Indians, driven step by step from the land they loved and in which they had lived for a thousand years; nor did the Southern States arbitrate with the unprepared Union.

No world power of to-day would arbitrate any vital matter with America, for whatever an enemy coveted she could take from us by force as easily as an efficient thug lifts a wallet from a fat millionaire, unworthy heir of virile grandsires. Never will Great Britain, Russia, Germany, or Japan arbitrate a vital dispute with America if they have power to dispense with arbitration and smash us to our knees with a sudden blow.

To expect arbitration without preparedness is ridiculous; it is indeed a contradiction of terms. How much

would it avail a sheep to propose arbitration to his butcher!

A sacred agreement resulting from solemn arbitration is certainly of far greater value than any mere prospect of arbitration, for it is the realization of the most sanguine hopes of the arbitrators. Yet within this very year past the futility of depending solely upon such agreements has been proved upon the naked bodies of unprepared Belgium, Persia, and China. When the war broke out, brave and thrifty Switzerland was fully prepared to defend her freedom and her honor, despite the fact that both were already "protected" by the most solemn international treaties of fair-minded arbitrators.

Belgium, preoccupied with business affairs and with money-making, trusted

almost entirely to sacred treaties, also the product of calm arbitration. For America the fate of Belgium is as a writing on the wall which plainly proclaims that the only valid insurance against unprovoked attack is adequate military preparedness. Had Belgium been adequately prepared to resist military aggression, then and then only would Germany *have respected arbitration and its sacred treaties, and have invaded France across the Franco-German border.*

Despite sentimental exaggeration in the Allied press, the Belgian army was so small and ill prepared that it succeeded in retarding the main German advance into France only about four days. Theoretically, the Belgian first line of fewer than 80,000 men could be reinforced by as many more reserves,

just as our line in America is theoretically backed by many thousand militia. Actually, Belgium's reserves were so inefficiently organized that few of them ever got into action, and those that did were nearly useless.

Treaties between nations are like contracts between persons: an unscrupulous person will refrain from breaking a contract only when the penalty attached thereto is greater than the gain. This is so generally recognized that men invariably attach penalty clauses to contracts which they make with one another.

The only penalty attached to the violation of the contract for Belgium's neutrality was the insufficient one of British intervention. From Germany's point of view the possibility of this intervention did not offset the

manifold advantages to be gained by a surprise attack upon France, which would result in confining the horrors of war to the enemy's territory.

Had Belgium been prepared to defend her borders this fact, *added* to the probability of British intervention, would have constituted a prohibitive penalty; for it should be remembered that even a small country may successfully defend herself from invasion. Serbia for more than a year defiantly held at bay the united power of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and finally succumbed only when she was stabbed in the back by Bulgaria, also a breaker of sacred treaties. Owing to the scientific deadliness of modern weapons it is possible to defend a frontier with fewer than 2000 men per mile, if these men have been properly trained

and organized. It is, for instance, a well-known fact, in military circles, that Germany has for a year held the western battle-line of nearly six hundred miles with fewer than 900,000 men, although opposed by the entire armies of France and Great Britain; and a German staff officer boasted to me that they could hold it against the world. A small country may defend herself against a big assailant, because her frontiers are short in proportion to her correspondingly small number of men of military age.

Belgium's case and its applicability to the United States may be aptly illustrated by the following example: burglars are unscrupulous persons who consider that the prospective gain incidental to robbing houses is greater than the penalty attached to the breaking of

their implied contract with society, the penalty being the danger of arrest and prosecution by the police. My own family residence is situated in a New York City block which has of late years been a favorite raiding-ground for summer burglars, who have made a practice of breaking into and pillaging houses left unoccupied during the hot months. My father, concluding from this circumstance that the New York police did not constitute a sufficient penalty clause, prudently decided to be prepared, and so every summer he has had the house wired by a protective association. The association's sign in the front window furnished a threat, which taken in conjunction with the danger of arrest by the regular police force, protected the house from attack for several summers, during which many

neighboring unprepared houses were looted.

In the summer of 1915 the electricians who wired the house temporarily neglected to place their warning sign in the window, thus removing the visibility of the threat.

A few nights later, a burglar mounted the front stoop, "jimmied" the outer door, and, entering the vestibule, began the destruction of the lock of the inner door.

The instant, however, that he had attacked the outer door, an alarm had been rung at the central office of the protective association, and two private detectives had departed on the run. While on their rapid way to the house they were joined by the corner policeman. The three together greatly outnumbered the thug, whom they over-

powered on the very threshold and frontier of the house, which he had not yet succeeded in entering. As he was led away to prison he protested vehemently that it was unfair to wire a house without posting it with warning notices.

To apply this illustration to Belgium, the British army may be represented by the corner policeman and the two detectives may represent the adequate military preparedness for lack of which her house was broken into. It is inconceivable that Germany could ever have been ignorant of the exact state of Belgium's preparedness; but could such have been the case, Germany, repelled from the Belgian frontier, would doubtless have been as indignant as the burglar who was being led to prison.

In America we are at present in a worse state than was Belgium in August, 1914, for we have not, as she had, treaties against invasion guaranteed by other nations—which would represent in a sort the corner policeman.

It is probable that within the next thousand years there will be evolved some system of international police capable of furnishing a sufficient penalty to insure the observance of treaties. I no more think of gainsaying this than of denying that within the same time the New York police may perhaps constitute a penalty clause capable of deterring robbers. No system of international police can however be effective until each separate nation is prepared to do its share towards maintaining universal peace, backing its promises by power to enforce them.

In the meantime, both our country and our houses are in need of reasonable defensive preparation.

America, however, still persistently refuses to read the writing on the wall. To the countries engaged in the great European struggle, America seems wilfully to have closed her eyes to the extent and dangers of the present crisis.

## CHAPTER II

### PRECEDENTS VERSUS SOPHISTRIES

TO-DAY the United States is the single peaceful-minded great nation of the earth; she stands unprotected amid a gang of calculating international robbers. Although no such thing as a police force of nations yet exists, she nevertheless refuses to arm herself, because, as she naïvely declares, she has no desire to attack any of the burglars.

She lives, as it were, in a time of pestilence, when all her neighbors have already been smitten with disease, and yet she fatuously claims that it will be time enough to begin to train physicians

when the black death grips her own vitals.

She stands in the midst of the greatest conflagration of history, which surrounds and already scorches her, and yet idiotically maintains that it will be time enough to organize fire departments when her own house catches fire.

Her people know little and care less about the complications of international diplomacy, and remain serenely confident that the question of war or no war will ever rest in their own hands. And yet within the last two decades every important nation in the world has been involved at least once in a war "to the finish," and Russia, Turkey, Japan, and Great Britain have participated not merely in one such war, but in two. Despite this, America's leading politicians still stick their pudgy




COMPARATIVE MAP OF EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

hands into the breasts of their frock coats and loudly orate that for America war is obsolete. Our Government allows more than eighteen months of world war to pass without taking or even seriously considering a single essential step toward an adequate system of national defense.

There *is* no valid argument against adequate military preparedness.

The anti-preparationists try hopelessly to defend their theories, but though eternally routed from position after position, they ever refuse to surrender to reason. As a rule they begin their argument by maintaining that arbitration is the never-failing panacea. When driven from that untenable

ground, they retreat, crying that our "mighty" navy could easily prevent any hostile army from landing on our shores. When a score of adverse facts are pointed out to them, such as that we are constructing torpedoes at a rate that would allow each tube in our navy to fire only one torpedo every six months, and that Great Britain can more than reproduce the effective ships of our fleet once every year, they promptly retreat to their next position; they maintain that our country is too big to be conquered, neglecting the patent fact that our very immensity makes us the more vulnerable to attacks and raids.

It is probable that few of us realize how large our country really is. How many know that California is more than three times as big as England, or

that Wyoming and Colorado are together as large as the German Empire? How many realize that the United States is nearly as large as the entire continent of Europe, as the accompanying map will show?

Consider what Germany might have accomplished with her unexpected offensive of 1914, if instead of the narrow boundaries of France, Belgium, and Switzerland to choose from she had had the entire contour of Europe, or of America, from which to select a point of attack.

Let us, however, meet the anti-preparationists upon their own ground. They point with pride to the immensity of the United States and remark cheerfully that mere size would prevent its subjection. I used to argue in that way myself until February, 1915.

Then while in Berlin I tried it in discussion with a staff officer of the German army. After a moment's hesitation, he said in his slow, accented English:

"It is true that your country is very large; but its heart is very small and very vulnerable, and you must remember, my friend, that in nations, as in individuals, the body falls if the heart is struck. Let us get a map; I will show you."

An atlas was brought, and he pointed out to me the vulnerable breast of my country. He, a foreigner, instructed me in the political geography of my own native land. He drew a line from the north of Chesapeake Bay up the Potomac to its upper reaches and from there along the foot of the Alleghanies, through Gettysburg, to

THE VULNERABLE HEART OF THE UNITED STATES

Harrisburg on the Susquehanna, and along that river to a point near Scranton. From there he skirted the foot of the Catskills through Sullivan County to Kingston, and thence passed rapidly along that river and Lake George and Lake Champlain to Canada.

This marks out the first great continuous natural line of defense which exists in the eastern part of the United States. It is six hundred miles in length, being about as long as the battle-line now drawn across France from the North Sea to the Alps. But the present battle-front in western Europe lies entirely across featureless country except for the short stretch along the "river" Aisne, a stream which any self-respecting American farmer would call a "crick." It has therefore been necessary to construct trenches that amount

to almost siege fortifications along every foot of its length. By contrast the dead-line across the Northeastern States comprises only two hundred and fifteen miles of land, while the remaining three hundred and eighty-five miles follow such effective natural barriers as the Potomac, Susquehanna and Hudson rivers, and Lake George and Lake Champlain, none of which can well be classified as creeks. Such a line, once occupied, could easily be held by 400,000 trained troops against any army in the world. An enemy landing at various points along the coast, could defeat the feeble forces which America could immediately oppose to him, and, having defeated them, immediately advance to this dead-line. There once established, can it be doubted that he could hold it against that mythical one

million men who Mr. Bryan declares would spring to arms between sunrise and sunset? The best result that unprepared America could hope to achieve would be a guerilla warfare in the fastnesses of the Alleghanies, the Catskills, and the Adirondacks, which might bring disaster to the enemy's daring cavalry raids against Buffalo, Pittsburgh, and intermediate points.

The territory of the United States lying to the east of this dead-line is about one half of the area which Germany now holds in Russia. It comprises only about 100,000 square miles, or less than half the total area of France. It is only three per cent. of the whole United States. It is not nearly as large as the single State of Montana. With the enemy holding this dead-line, the country east of it

would become a second Belgium, wherein the slightest resistance or insubordination on the part of individual men would result in the visitation of dire reprisals upon entire communities.

Although this eastern region is in area only three per cent. of the United States, it is verily the heart of our country, for it contains nearly all the factories which might be converted into munition producers, the principal navy yards, and the war colleges; the headquarters of our general staffs; the capitals of the States of Maine, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania; the executive centers of all our great industries; New York, the richest city in the world; Washington, the capital of our country, containing

all the machinery of national government; half the wealth of the country; and twenty-five million people.

If this heart of America should be seized by an invader, the plight of the nation as a whole would be desperate.

The paralyzation of its industries and its Government would be beyond the wildest imaginings of the most sensational alarmist. Within a week the country would revert to the conditions of its pioneer days, when every man was fully and completely occupied in the struggle to provide life-sustaining food for his family and himself. The fugitive President would be the only remaining vestige of government; from his refuge in St. Louis or thereabouts he would be forced to make peace on any terms and at any price, just as the Government of France, when in 1871

it replaced the deposed and dishonored Napoleon III, was compelled to buy peace on the enemy's own terms in order to free Paris and northern France from the German armies that had caught her off-guard and unprepared. Our country could be forced to pay an indemnity large enough to refill the greatest war-chest or to finance two or three European wars. In addition, it would be plundered of Alaska's lumber and gold, of Mexico's minerals, and of Panama, Hawaii and Cuba, the political and commercial keys of the Western Hemisphere.

Verily the grinning thug would have made a rich and rapid haul from the fat, defenseless heir of virile fighting grandparents.

His victim would have had no time for argument.

A speedy peace would be necessary not merely to redeem a hundred cities and a hundred billion dollars' worth of property, but in order to liberate 25,000,000 hostages, cut off by the invading army from their accustomed food supply. The inhabitants of the second Belgium would have had no time to escape in the terrible disorder and congestion which always accompany invasion, a confusion which would be increased through the destruction of crucial bridges and tunnels by the enemy's spies and raiders. When in the autumn of 1914 the Teutons approached Paris, all the common carriers running out of the city became so disorganized that the only means of escape left to the masses was to travel on foot.

The plan of invasion which I have here outlined was included in an

article which appeared in the *Century Magazine* for November. It immediately evoked ridicule from various anti-preparationists, and the Hon. A. P. Gardner, Representative from Massachusetts, wrote to Admiral Dewey—the sole American officer who is in position to make public statements as to the nation's military and naval needs—asking him for an expression of opinion upon my statements.

Admiral Dewey's reply, read by Mr. Gardner in his speech to the House of Representatives on December 16, was in part as follows:

*"Dear Mr. Gardner:*

"I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 9 asking me to write you, setting forth my views on the question of the possibility of large hostile forces landing on our coast and

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CONGRESSMAN AUGUSTUS P. GARDNER
Leader of the cause of Preparedness in the House of Representatives

Photograph by Clinedinst, Washington

CONGRESSMAN CLAUDE KITCHIN
Leader of the Opposition to Preparedness in the House of Representatives

inviting my attention to an article by Eric Fisher Wood.

"The part of the Atlantic coast mentioned in Mr. Wood's article extends from Eastport, Me., to Cape Henry, Va. . . . It is true that a large hostile force can land on the open coast wherever transports can get within a reasonable distance of the shore, especially so where their landing is covered by the gun-fire of the naval escort even though the landing be opposed by troops. . . . From Eastport, Me., to Cape Henry, Va., there are but very few places where large ships cannot approach to within two miles of the coast. . . .

"They would prefer to land where there are railroads, and good roads leading to their objective, which would probably be one of our large cities. Such places are numerous along the coast of Massachusetts, both shores of Massachusetts Bay, the eastern and southern shores of Long Island, and

in the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays. . . .

"Our main defense and protection from invasion must always rest with the navy, which must ever remain our first and best line of defense. This defense unless adequate is impotent; and as before stated adequacy is not reached until the navy is strong enough to meet on equal terms the navy of the strongest possible adversary.

"Sincerely yours,
"GEORGE DEWEY."

Driven from their contention that America is too big to be conquered, the anti-preparationists, disregarding the fact that preparedness is not a temporary issue, maintain that when the present war is over, the nations of Europe will be exhausted and therefore of necessity harmless. But this is *not* true. The precedents of history prove

the exact reverse to be the case. Nations are never so strong morally and politically and their armies are never so effective, as immediately following a long conflict.

"Practice makes perfect." Greece was never stronger than after Platæa and Salamis, nor Rome than after the Second Carthaginian War. The Netherlands were politically most powerful at the termination of forty years of combat with Spain, during which they were on the receiving end of nearly every blow.

In 1862 France dared to disregard the Monroe Doctrine and invade Mexico to protect her citizens from persecution by the irresponsible savages who inhabited that territory. In 1865 she meekly agreed to abandon Mexico and Maximilian, for even Napoleon III

had no wish to try conclusions with the veteran army that marched down Pennsylvania Avenue on May 23, 1865.

A nation may begin a war with five million soldiers, and a year later may have lost one million of them, but half of the survivors could probably defeat an unseasoned army of five millions.

It is true that at the end of a long war a nation's credit is poor, but this is not vital. It means that large prices must be paid for loans. It does *not* mean that loans cannot be obtained. If a nation has in prospect a profitable victory it can obtain large loans.

Driven from this last position, anti-preparationists announce that they would not defend even their ideals and their conception of right by force of arms. They advocate immediate and complete surrender in case of attack—

a well-intentioned perversion of the turn-the-other-cheek principle. This willingness to be a part of a nation's martyrdom, while it may indicate a kind of passive courage, is largely born of lack of imagination, an utter inability to picture the fruits of such a policy.

If it were typical of the esprit of the nation as a whole; if it were not contrary to the laws of our domestic life, to the workings of our National Government and to our historic traditions, such a policy would be infinitely preferable to our present one of combining an aggressive diplomatic tone with utter physical helplessness.

It might be possible to buy off each successive antagonist by handing over to him whatever he happened to covet, just as one child is thrown from a flee-

ing Russian *troika* to delay the pursuing wolves, and save the others.

But our nation is neither meek nor soft-spoken. Its citizens are proud, impatient of restraint and discipline, and quick to resent an injury. They could not be made to tolerate outside interference, much less an invasion. They would not hesitate to attack with their bare hands any invaders even though these enemies were incased in armor, and bore gleaming swords in their mailed fists.

# CHAPTER III

## PREPARATIONISTS ARE PACIFISTS

THE people of the United States are not divided into pacifists and jingoes. All Americans desire peace, and differ only as to the best means of securing it, or disagree as to the measure of honor or dishonor with which we may buy that peace. It is most naturally that we should all earnestly desire peace since we have everything to gain by peace and much to lose by war.

Both the preparationist and the anti-preparationist are pacifists. The latter is an idealist, who making the wish father to the thought, believes only that which it is pleasant to believe. The

former tries to search out the unvarnished truth and having found it determines to face it bravely, whether it be pleasant or unpleasant. He does not try to persuade himself that helplessness is any protection from invasion.

America has always been a peace-loving nation. In none of the wars of her history has she been the aggressor. At Concord that first shot which was "heard round the world" was not fired by the colonists. In 1846 it needed a horror like the massacre of the Alamo before our Government would face the necessity of dealing rigorously with Mexico. In 1861 the majority of the people in the North were still declaring that the South would never under any circumstances resort to arms when the cannon at Fort Sumter cut short their foolish predictions.

We have ever in the past had war forced upon us, and have ever been unprepared to meet it. We shall most certainly have wars forced upon us in the future. Shall we continue to be unprepared to meet them?

Due to fortunate combinations of circumstances we have not, in four of the five wars of our history, reaped the full penalty of our unpreparedness. We emerged victorious from the Revolution and the War of 1812 because Spain and France waged war against England at the same time and gave us vital aid, choosing those crucial moments to be avenged for old quarrels with England.

We won the wars of 1848 and 1898 only because we were pitted against weak nations.

Our one terrible lesson, the only les-

son the penalties of which were commensurate with our neglect, was the Civil War. In 1860 our need, as demonstrated by contemporaneous exponents of preparedness, was for a compact standing army of not more than 100,000 men. To any one who studies the history of that epoch it must be evident that had we possessed such an army, the Civil War need never have been fought. Some military authorities even go so far as to state that a single efficient army corp of 30,000 men would absolutely have prevented that war, in which a million men lost their lives. Our troops could have suppressed the disorder in the South long before it reached armed conflict, and forced the South to settle its differences with the Government at Washington by arbitration.

America is so large that she has no need to fight for more territory, as Japan and Germany have fought and will fight; she is so rich that she has no temptation to strive for indemnities; and she is too proud to indulge in quarrels over trifles. May she, however, never be unready to hold her boundaries against an enemy or to protect herself from invasion! May she likewise ever be prepared to defend the ideals for which she stands! A nation without vigorous ideals is a nation unfit, a nation doomed to destruction. Conquered nations have sometimes regained their freedom, but no nation without ideals to defend, and the will to defend them, has long survived.

If after the battle of Concord the majority of our colonial ancestors had been Tories (the pacifists of 1776) and

had voted peace at any price, we should now be taxed without representation, be ruled by a nation which would allow us no general manhood suffrage, and our territory would still be subject to huge land grants which reserved vast areas for nonresident nobility. By accepting the gage of battle, we won liberty and established a great nation.

We even freed all England's colonies from the tyranny against which we fought, for by that bitter lesson we taught her the wisdom of granting autonomy to her daughters; in consequence of which the inhabitants of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa to-day really enjoy more freedom than the inhabitants of England herself. As regards human liberty, we, by the Revolution, set forward the hands on the clock of time at least a

century. We even did England herself a service; for in her present need, when she is struggling to maintain her privileges, opportunities, and ideals, she is supported by a group of strong and loyal colonies because she has long allowed them to share with her those privileges, opportunities, and ideals.

No price that can be counted in dollars, pounds, or francs is too great to pay for peace. No price that will build up an adequate navy and an efficient army is too great. We all desire that America may have as few wars as possible, but we must face the fact that she cannot always avoid wars.

Even to-day one may perceive several causes pregnant with the possibility of future hostilities for the United States. Mexico is one; South America, coveted by Germany, but protected

by the Monroe Doctrine, is another; still a third exists in the fact that our western labor unions refuse to allow us to grant equal rights to certain Orientals because of racial antagonism and because these Orientals, being more industrious and efficient than the average American day laborer, are willing to work for lower wages. The labor unions, making might their right, have caused laws to be passed, the object of which is to keep their State for their own use by rendering it virtually impossible for the Orientals to compete with them industrially. The might upon which this right is founded cannot go forever unchallenged. Sooner or later, in ten years or in ten decades, it may have to be tested by a trial of arms. If the case between the California labor unions and the Oriental immigrants

were to be submitted to fair and impartial international arbitration, it is probable that the Orientals would win the decision, but it is evident that our Government could not accept such a decision against the will of its own people.

Thus from time to time differences arise between nations which cannot be peacefully arbitrated. When a rich nation is politically weak, while a neighboring country is poor and cramped but politically powerful, the latter will possess itself of the former's territory, as inevitably as water runs down hill. The attack will come the more quickly if racial differences render the two nations naturally antagonistic. It makes little difference whether the rich nation has become relatively weak through race degeneration or through fatuous neglect of her defenses. The invasion of

France by the Norsemen, the overrunning of the Roman Empire by the barbarians, and the recent nibblings at China by many nations, are conspicuous examples among many to be found in history. The English, in the days of sailing ships and voyages around the Cape, traveled some ten thousand miles to conquer India, a country at that time thirty times larger than England both in area and in population, but disorganized and defenseless. The Americas, Australia, and Africa have in succession been conquered by invasions from Europe, until they are to-day entirely held by European races or their descendants.

History itself is, in the broadest sense, nothing but a record of *successive* conquests won over nations lacking sufficient military preparedness.

For two centuries past no distance has ever been great enough to protect any race or nation from attack.

Uncoördinated bulk has ever been a danger rather than a protection. Latent but disorganized resources are valueless. China is latently the most powerful nation of the world, but this fact has in no way retarded her dispossession. Like India she would long since have been entirely gobbled up had it not been for the mutual jealousies of her assailants.

## CHAPTER IV

### A WARNING AND AN EXAMPLE

DURING the present war the terms, struggle for existence, and survival of the fittest, have been often used, but have had read into them strange meanings never warranted by any of the scientists of the evolutionary school.

The horrors of the great conflict have shaken the world out of its habitual ruts of thought, and bewildered by the destruction of many of its old formulæ, peoples and nations are trying to find some underlying principle which will at least sound like an explanation

of the inexplicable things happening in Europe. Thus many writers have declared that Germany, in her present methods of frightfulness, was simply putting into practical use Darwin's theory of the struggle for existence, where brute force was the supreme appeal in which all the considerations of humanity and the results of civilization were to be thrown aside until ruthless barbarity would become the determining factor of national survival.

To ascribe such a doctrine to Darwin or to any leading evolutionist is monstrous. The injustice to Darwin is of minor importance, but that the excitement of war should bring into prominence phrases that give a dangerous twist to public thought is a thing that ought not to go on without a protest.

In point of fact, even every half-

baked college boy knows that Darwin never taught that the survival of the fittest either meant that the best survived, or that the physically most powerful survived. He simply held that in each era those individuals survive and perpetuate themselves who are best able to profit by or adapt themselves to the particular conditions which environ them.

For confirmation of the law that survival, national as well as individual, depends on the ability to fit oneself to meet surrounding conditions, we need not draw upon the imagination, lean on theories, nor delve into ancient history, since the most striking examples of the practical working of that law have been demonstrated both positively and negatively before our eyes—in the cases of Japan and China.

The American after dinner attitude

of mind is that we rescued Japan from semi-barbarism and politely invited her to enter into the circle of civilized nations. In point of fact for long generations before Perry's ship entered the Bay of Yedo, the Japanese had been an educated, civilized and cultured people. The form of their civilization was a little out of date it is true, being feudal in type and non-militant in spirit.

They had, wisely or unwisely, some two centuries before decided that their civilization was superior to that of surrounding nations.

They, therefore, deliberately decided to protect themselves from any undesirable outside influences and taking the only possible way to avoid conforming to or coming in competition with neighboring races they closed their gates and shut themselves inside the narrow

limits of their island home. No foreigner was allowed to enter; if he came in by accident as shipwrecked soldiers occasionally did, he was never again permitted to leave. If a Japanese departed secretly from his native land he was not allowed to return.

Japan thus furnishes the most important example of a deliberate attempt to escape the law that the survival of a nation depends upon adapting itself to its environment. Her experiment was even temporarily successful. It was, however, possible only so long as oceans remained barriers of isolation, when they became highways of communication, her defiance of natural law broke down.

As long as we Americans continue to pat ourselves on the back, and clasping hands across the Pacific, exhibit Japan

as our ward whom we invited into the family of civilization we completely lose the whole point and lesson of the historic incident. Indirectly we did bring ultimate benefits to Japan, for which she is now justly grateful and which are powerful reasons for closer and closer unity between the two peoples, but at the time it was quite different; Japan's one desire was to be left to herself to preserve her feudal system, to elaborate her complicated ceremonials, and to develop her great art. If our entrance into Japanese affairs was such a love feast, why did we force our way into her harbors with warships?

The negotiations extending over some years were carried on, it is true, with due regard to diplomatic usages, many friendly and flattering speeches were exchanged, but the bare fact remains that

our warships and their guns made somber background for much glittering ceremony. We meant to open the ports of Japan; most certainly by friendly means if possible, but the Japanese understood the background of warships, and realized that they were no longer able to prevent invasion. With their feudal form of government and their obsolete weapons, they were powerless before us. In one moment they were forced to face the consequence of having so long defied the law of evolution by which nations as well as individuals must conform to the rules of the game.

Had the Japanese been barbarians or even uncivilized they would have gone under; they were, however, then as now, a brainy, resolute, patriotic and fearless people. The humility of submit-

ting to demands which they dared not refuse, and were powerless to resist, sank deep into the public consciousness. With marvelous self-control they covered their wounded pride under courteous phrases and patiently bided their time.

Their whole subsequent history is a conscious, deliberate, and determined effort, and a most successful one to make up for lost time, and thoroughly to fit themselves as a nation for survival in the environment into which America had forced them to enter.

They worked rapidly but never too rapidly for thoroughness. Investigating first and executing afterwards, they did not stumble nor blunder, nor conceitedly try to develop along their obsolete lines. Revering national traditions, reverencing ancient customs, lov-

ing the arts of peace, they yet threw away everything that was an obstacle to an assured national existence.

In any field of accomplishment they asked only what was the best, and having decided that question, they promptly adopted it, thus profiting by hundreds of years of experiment which has been conducted by other nations. For navy, they modeled after England; for army, after Germany; in electricity and railroads, they called on America; for art inspiration they had long since looked to China—that they did not at the reorganization replace it by occidental art amply proves that they deemed it inferior to their own.

Early in the program for Japanese re-creation it was found that progress was blocked by the feudal organization of the people, involving class division

which could not be bridged. Judging that a constitutional monarchy was the best form of government for the new Japan, it became necessary to abolish these class distinctions—what France accomplished only after the bloody revolution and England has even now only imperfectly secured after centuries of struggle, Japan accomplished in a single day. In 1876 after several years warning, she abolished the Samurai class, discontinued the pensions they had through generations enjoyed, and made it illegal for them longer to wear the swords which had been the insignia of their rank as members of the noble class.

The leveling of the highest class accomplished, it next became necessary to raise the lowest class of despised yeta to honorable citizenship, and to

recognition as fellow countrymen. This it was hoped to accomplish through elementary compulsory education where all the children would be constantly associated; but when the public schools were opened it was found that the children of the Samurai class would not study beside the yeta children, whereupon some of the highest nobles of the country patriotically solved the question by going, themselves, into the schools and sitting on the benches beside the despised little outcasts.

Thus did Japan ruthlessly abandon, cut out, or destroy anything in her national life which might, in the struggle for national existence, render her less fit to survive. No other nation except France has so freed herself from obsolete forms and hampering traditions, and France gained her emancipation

only through the most terrible revolution of history.

Japan's patriotism permitted her to reconstruct her forms of government, and abolish all privileged classes with calmness and courage, and without bloodshed. Her reward for bringing herself into harmony with the law of evolution is that she has been able, not only to preserve her national existence, but materially to enlarge her borders and to take her rightful rank as one of the great nations of the earth.

She realized that she had to sacrifice many beloved ideals to worldly economic fitness if she wished to continue to exist.

With Japan's progress is contrasted China's inertia. What she was fifty years ago she practically is to-day; unwieldy, uncoördinated and self-satis-

fied. Out of harmony with the law of survival she would long ago have fallen to pieces of her own weight if mutual jealousies among the powers had not kept her together by outside pressure.

Many nations have nibbled at her borders, and the first one that has a free hand will annex her bodily. Latently she is the most powerful nation of the earth, not only on account of her vast population and great area, but more especially because she is an old race, wise in many things little known to occidental peoples. She has forgotten much and neglected more that, if organized, would be of vital use in a national emergency. Her people are the personification of economy, patience and tenacity. There are at present some signs of an awakening in China's centuries of sleep. What future policy

she develops, depends very much upon Japan, whose armed hand at present lies heavy on her unprotected body. Until China complies with the law of survival by adapting herself to conditions as they are to-day, the question of her national existence lies not in her own hands, but in the hands of those nations who have already adjusted themselves in harmony with fundamental evolutionary laws.

In an era when all the surrounding nations are armed, if one country deliberately decides not to fit herself to meet this condition, she cannot hope to survive whether her name be China or the United States of America.

If I seem in a work of preparedness for America to have given an undue proportion of space to Japanese conditions, it is not by accident, but because Japa-

nese prowess and progress has an immediate and most vital bearing on our own requirements for army and navy increase. Japan as our friend and well-wisher would be a powerful national asset. As an enemy or even as a neighbor with a grievance she must remain a serious menace. We in America need first to have better comprehension of her valuable qualities as a co-worker and a truer estimate of her power as an antagonist. Understanding the proud spirit of her people we ought to hesitate to wound that pride.

England, who of all nations, has the farthest sight in matters of diplomacy made a defensive treaty with Japan as early as 1902; the later treaty of 1905 was in 1911 renewed for ten years longer.

Japan is not a rich country, and her

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THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Preparationist
With Mr. Roosevelt are shown also the Russian and Japanese Peace Commissioners who met in America in 1905.

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WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN
Anti-Preparationist

resources were much strained by the war with Russia. We may, however, be sure that she will fight in the future, as she has in the past, whenever her national pride is submitted to too great humiliation.

Moreover she is always prepared to fight if needs must be. Her army is kept at high efficiency. She is steadily increasing her navy. Her political importance in the world's counsel insures to her valuable allies. Her medical corps is a model for the whole world and she has had experience in three wars.

Most important of all, she possesses a united, devoted and intensely patriotic people, to every one of whom any form of self sacrifice for the country's safety, is a joy and consecration.

The Japanese have universal service and universal enthusiasm in military duty.

# CHAPTER V

## ARMY REFORM

IN determining America's specific requirement for adequate national defense, we should first estimate the number of troops, together with all necessary supplies, ammunition, and horses, which could by an enemy be landed upon our coast.

In this connection it is necessary to consider as possible opponents not only Japan and Germany but all the other powerful nations of the world, for history shows that the friends of to-day may be enemies to-morrow, just as enemies of this year may be friends the next. Japan and Russia are to-day

allies, who ten years ago were bitterest enemies, while Bulgaria and Serbia, who together defeated Turkey in 1912, have since that time already fought against each other in one war and are now in the throes of another.

Before an enemy who attacks us can transport troops overseas, he must have almost complete control of those seas. Therefore, if we could be certain that no hostile war fleet could ever deprive us of control of our oceans, we might dispense with military preparedness beyond that needed to protect our outlying possessions and our Canadian and Mexican borders. Conversely, if we cannot be certain of commanding the two oceans, we must build up an army of sufficient size to discourage invasion.

It should be remembered that since we possess *two* long and widely sepa-

rated coast lines, we cannot be even moderately certain of maintaining sea control unless we constantly maintain a navy virtually twice as large and effective as the navy of any other nation.

One man at Panama might with dynamite cut our navy in two. A landslide would, and several times has, accomplished the same result.

Moreover, it should be remembered that no navy, however large it is, can absolutely be trusted to maintain control of the seas. In a day the *Merrimac* gained control of the sea for the Confederacy; and within a few hours the *Monitor* won it back again. The day Great Britain launched the first dreadnought the other navies of the world became obsolete, and so remained until they too acquired ships of the dreadnought class; since a single dread-

nought could sink a fleet of predreadnoughts.

To possess a large navy reduces the chances of invasion. The larger navy a country possesses, the less likely is she to lose sea control, and the fewer nations or coalitions of nations need she fear. It must not be forgotten, however, that in the present war even the second navy of the world has been unable to leave the shelter of its fortified harbors, and the war is in consequence being fought out entirely on land.

It would be inadvisable, if not impossible for America to maintain the largest navy in the world. Moreover, her geographical situation makes it peculiarly difficult for a navy alone to protect her from attack. She is therefore compelled to possess also adequate land forces.

Having determined that our navy cannot be counted upon to protect us from all attacks, we must next consider the scope of possible invasions and try to determine the minimum defense which would be necessary to meet them with success. Japan, the most powerful nation on our west, using only half her merchant fleet as transports, could in four weeks land one hundred thousand men and twenty-five thousand horses on our Pacific coast, and, as additional vessels became available, could in each succeeding period of six weeks land another detachment of one hundred and forty thousand men and thirty-five thousand horses.

Any one of the several militant nations on our east could land much larger forces in less time. Germany, for instance, could by using less than half her

merchant marine, in two weeks land half a million men and fifty thousand horses on our Atlantic seaboard. And in each succeeding month would be able to land an army of six hundred thousand reinforcements.

These figures are based upon official statistics. Lloyd's Register for 1914–15 credits Germany with 5,090,331 gross tons of steel merchant ships. The regulations of the German army do not, however, permit the use of steamers of less than 2000 gross tons for the transportation of troops; of such ships Germany possesses, according to Lloyd, 4,018,185 tons.

The Japanese Field Service Regulations specify that three gross tons are sufficient to transport a man and all equipment and supplies no matter what the size of the ship. In the United

States Field Service Regulations for 1914 (page 208) three gross tons is given as the minimum allowed for the transportation of a soldier, and ten gross tons as the minimum for a horse; under ordinary peace conditions larger space is permitted.

Lloyd's Register, 1914–15, shows that there is *not a single ship* of over 2000 tons in the *entire German merchant marine* which does not possess speed enough to cross the Atlantic Ocean in twelve days.

By combining these figures it is evident that the statement that Germany could land half a million men upon our eastern coast in two weeks' time is far from a ridiculous one. Before the present war there were many theories as to how long it would take Germany to mobilize after she had declared war

on France. In point of fact, inside the German border and ranged parallel with the boundary of Belgium, a large German army was marking time before any declaration of war, and at that moment needed only to be given the word to step across the border. It is certainly not unreasonable to suppose that Germany might embark her men before she chose to declare war against America.

It is naturally to be expected that we would not be attacked by a small nation, and that if invaded by a powerful nation she would certainly organize and send against us the largest force possible. We must also remember that international alliances have become the order of the day; that wars are now almost invariably fought by coalitions of nations. Thus France and Great Brit-

ain, although hereditary enemies, combined in the Crimea to support Turkey against Russia. To-day Russia, Great Britain, and France have temporarily united against their common rival, Germany. Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, who have long felt toward one another a ferocious hatred, nevertheless combined in the last Balkan war to attack Turkey, their common foe.

It is therefore highly probable that we may some day have to fight against a combination of two or more nations. If, after the present hostilities have ceased, Japan and Germany should both be antagonistic toward us, nothing could be more according to precedent than that they should temporarily compromise their present difficulties in order to deal us more successful blows. This is, however, only a possibility, and

since I am pleading for the minimum of preparedness rather than for the maximum, I will assume for purposes of discussion that we shall be in conflict with only one nation at a time.

An enemy, having fifty-five hundred miles of coast from which to choose a point of attack, would naturally not attempt to land near any one of our fortified ports, which reminds us that coast defenses are useless without an adequate mobile field army to prevent landings in the wide gaps between them. Even the Dardanelles would have fallen in short order had the splendid forts not been amply supported by the Germanized Turkish field army.

It is therefore self-evident that an enemy landing five hundred thousand trained and organized troops on our coast in two weeks would need to be op-

posed by an equal force that could be mobilized in the same length of time. We must be ready to match numbers for numbers, quality for quality, and speed for speed, up to the ultimate limit of the enemy's strength at the point of attack. Effectively to defend the Atlantic coast, we should therefore be obliged within two weeks' time to mobilize 500,000 men and transport them to the scene of action. In two months we should need to put into the field against the enemy's principal attack 1,500,000 troops. At least one million additional men would be necessary to guard against feints and raids, to protect our lines of communication and our arsenals from attack by spies and agents of the enemy and to perform transport and base-line duties. European armies are to-day employing at

least as many men behind the battle line and along the lines of communication as they have in the actual front.

Thus we arrive at a minimum total of 2,500,000 men necessary to defend us against the attack of a single great nation. Such an army would even then rank only eighth in size among the armies of the world.

# CHAPTER VI

## THE SWISS SYSTEM

IT is manifestly impossible for us to maintain a standing army of 2,500,000 men. The objections which Americans have to great standing armies like those of Germany and Russia are well-founded. Militarism of the extreme type is overbearing, aggressive and brutal. How then can we ever be prepared to mobilize the needed number of trained and organized troops?

In answer to this question our military experts unanimously advocate the adoption of a system of universal compulsory military service based upon

and largely copied from the Swiss system and its counterpart in Australia.

Under the monarchical systems of Europe, the governments take from one to three years out of the life of every grown man, in order that he may be made into an efficient soldier. These years are a dead loss to the individual since they come at a time when he should already have started upon his life's work.

The democratic systems of Switzerland and Australia are in strong contrast to these monarchical systems. In Switzerland and Australia the individual spends but a few weeks in military training AFTER he has reached his twenty-first year. This is made possible because in these countries every boy receives the equivalent of about one year's military training as a part of his edu-

cation. This training is for him a distinct gain. It serves as a vehicle of education, like mathematics or the languages, and as a vehicle of education military training is unsurpassed. It is the only vehicle of education which teaches patriotism.

In the Australian system, military science, taught by competent official instructors, forms a compulsory part of the education of every boy between the ages of twelve and eighteen; during those years he undergoes military instruction coincidently with his other studies, so that he reaches the age of nineteen a trained soldier. His military education is imparted to him at the most acquisitive age, and does not interfere with his later productive, industrial occupations. When he reaches the age of nineteen he is en-



DR. LYMAN ABBOTT
Preparationist

rolled as a soldier in the battalion of the region in which he lives. From that time he is in active service for two weeks of every year, for practice which is intended to keep fresh in mind his military knowledge. He remains a member of the battalion for eight years, until he reaches the age of twenty-seven, and throughout that period he is at all times liable for service in defense of his country. After reaching the age of nineteen he thereafter undergoes only about one hundred and twelve days' training. He cannot, however, be sent out of Australia unless he expressly volunteers for foreign service. The Australian army unit is a battalion of one thousand men. The country is therefore divided into units of population each of which contains approximately one thousand young men

between the ages of nineteen and twenty-seven.

In Switzerland the young men, after having had preliminary training in school, join their regiments in their twentieth year, and during the summer of that year undergo two months of continuous, intensive military instruction. For twelve years thereafter they are at all times liable for immediate service in defense of their country. During each of these years they perform two weeks' training in the field. After the age of twenty, only about thirty weeks of military service are required, except in case of war.

The system recommended by American experts for adoption by this country would begin with the training of all boys between the ages of twelve and

eighteen in gymnastics, hygiene, the manual of arms, rifle practice, and platoon and company formations. In the summer of his nineteenth year every boy would be assigned to his regiment and begin active service with two months of intensive training in battalion, regimental, and brigade manœuvers, and afterward, he would be enrolled for service for four years, or until he is twenty-three—his service in time of peace being limited to two weeks spent in camp each summer. At twenty-three years of age the young man would be mustered out of his regiment and placed in the reserve, from which he could be called to active service only in case of dire need. This system would eventually furnish the United States with an active army of 2,500,000 men under twenty-four years of age,

and with a reserve of nearly 8,000,000 trained soldiers between the ages of twenty-four and forty-five who could be called upon in case of a long war. Thus after his eighteenth year a total of only fourteen weeks' military training would be required of each normal male citizen.

No member of the citizen forces would be required either to serve outside the territory of the United States or to aid in suppressing local civil disorders such as strikes.

Each year in the United States a million men reach the age of twenty of whom about 65 per cent. are fit for military service.

Military training and service would, under peace conditions, be completely finished by all men before they reached their twenty-fourth birthday, thus in-

terfering as little as possible with their productive life. In the event that war were thrust upon us, the casualties would be borne by a class of men who, for the most part, had not yet acquired families or reached positions of great responsibility.

It should not be forgotten that the adoption of a system of preparedness in no way increases the liability of the individual to serve as a soldier in the event of war. If we should have a big war in the near future, the draft would, of necessity, be instituted and enforced and our citizens would all have to fight, whether they liked it or not. Preparedness renders such an eventuality less likely, and makes it improbable that if we do fight, our dead would have to die in vain.

To adopt the Swiss system it will not

be necessary for the United States to institute new units of population, since she already possesses such units in her national congressional districts. Every district could be called upon to furnish a mixed brigade composed of two regiments of infantry, two batteries of field artillery, a squadron of cavalry, a transport train, a signal-corps detachment, a company of engineers, and a field hospital. Certain western districts would be called upon to support brigades composed of cavalry regiments and a battalion of horse artillery.

The brigades thus formed would be organized into divisions, corps, and armies under the supervision of the general staff at Washington, presided over by a *military* secretary of war. The standing army would be limited to

staff officers, instructors, and engineers; to a certain amount of infantry, cavalry, and field-artillery for foreign garrison duty, in Alaska, the Philippines, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal Zone, and for manning in part our coast defenses; to such a number of officers as would be sufficient to supervise the military training of our boys and to maintain an adequate reserve supply of munitions; it would include certain highly trained crack regiments, especially of mountain, siege, and field artillery, by which the experimental work necessary to determine the proper standard of military efficiency would be carried on. West Point, the army service schools, the garrison regiments, and the crack military regiments would all be used as means of training professional officers for staff appointments and for high

commands in the national field forces. All the company officers and a certain number of the field officers of the line regiments would be civilians who had voluntarily undergone special training and won promotion by marked ability.

# CHAPTER VII

## EDUCATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY TRAINING

IN addition to its protective value, such a military system yields educational and economic benefits which at least equal its defensive importance. The result most generally obtained, and the one which would be of greatest importance to the United States, is the fostering of a sense of mutual responsibility between the State and the individual. Even if there were no need of national defense and no rumors of wars, the Swiss system would more than repay its cost to Switzerland in the increased physical vigor and im-

proved mentality of its citizens. It inculcates promptness, obedience, exactness, self-control, and truthfulness. It teaches discipline, and hygiene. It tends to mold the heterogeneous elements of the nation into homogeneity, a result sorely needed by the conglomeration of assorted nationalities assembled, but not yet blended together, under the American flag. Her military system has made of modern Switzerland a fearless and united country, notwithstanding the fact that her population is made up of French, Germans, and Italians, speaking three languages and acknowledging two religions.

If such a system were adopted by the United States every growing boy would be constantly under inspection by trained surgeons and military experts. His physical weaknesses and

mental defects would be considered and, as far as possible, remedied. It is now well recognized that a large proportion of the ineffective, criminal, or insane members of society suffer from physical defects that could so far be modified during childhood as to make useful citizens out of potentially dangerous persons. Many defects which cannot be detected by superficial inspection become very evident during military training, which not only provided the instructors with an opportunity to study deficiencies, but furnishes also the means and time for applying the remedies.

Military training, outdoor life, and expert supervision by men who understand crude boyish impulses would do much toward converting lawless energy into disciplined power. The women

of Australia at first so strongly opposed the plan for compulsory military training that they retarded and nearly defeated its adoption; within two years' time, however, the wonders which it had wrought in their own boys converted them into its most ardent advocates.

One of the strongest arraignments of our American civilization is the great number of inefficient, unmoral, or criminal persons in whom the State takes no interest unless they have been officially labeled paupers, idiots, or criminals. We make no intelligent effort to diminish by protective measures such wastefulness of a nation's best asset—its citizens. Another serious defect in our national life in America is the lack of loyalty for or sense of duty toward the Government. Europeans emphat-

ically declare us the most unpatriotic nation in the world.

These defects would be remedied, or at least greatly mitigated by military training which rapidly develops *civic consciousness.* It teaches the young to revere their flag. Their patriotism kindled at the most susceptible age, abides with them all their lives thereafter. It becomes no longer a phrase, a song, a momentary emotion, but the mainspring of their civic life. It grows with their growth, they breathe it in with every inspiration. As their country makes herself responsible for their well-being, they, in return, feel responsibility for her safety and prosperity, and realize that it is the right and duty of every citizen to defend his country. They learn that if the need arises, they must even make the su-

preme sacrifice of dying for that country. It is a wholesome thought, which teaches them to make cheerfully the thousand smaller sacrifices of good citizenship.

If any one of us questions whether it is worth while to make the supreme sacrifice of dying for the ideals and the safety of his native land, the best authority to accept in answer to this question is the man who is actually making that sacrifice; as, for instance, a mortally wounded soldier. It sometimes happens that fatally wounded men lie without pain and with clear minds for several hours before they die. They realize their approaching fate with a certainty which comes only to men who feel that the very foundation of life has crumbled. They live a very long time in those last few hours. They review

minutely their whole lives, weighing and considering. They are detached and unprejudiced, as only those can be who have absolutely nothing more either to gain or to lose. They can then most justly estimate what is of true value and what is not.

In France I have talked with many such men, have taken down their last messages; have, in answer to their craving for human companionship, sat by them until they died. Most of them were not philosophers, they were not even officers, but only simple soldiers who before the war had been perhaps clerks or farmers; and yet each and every one of them was filled with a sublime and radiant contentment because he was dying for his conception of right, for his *patrie,* for his ideals.

Their faces wore beatific smiles, and

their eyes shone with a light of great happiness. Never again can one who has seen such heroic deaths ask himself that coward question, "Is it worth while to make the supreme sacrifice in defense of one's ideals?"

# CHAPTER VIII

## TEMPORARY EXPEDIENTS

TO-DAY at least seven nations possess armies of far more than two and one-half million men. An army of that size is, therefore, for us the irreducible minimum. If we are to hold our place among the great nations of the world, we must stop thinking in thousands and begin to think in millions.

The system of universal military service recommended by our staff officers and based upon the successful Swiss and Australian systems cannot suddenly be put into full operation; legal and political obstacles must first be overcome, and even when this has been accom-

plished the system will give us an effective army only after it has been for several years in process of development. It is imperative that for the interim we make some immediate provision for national safety; since an international crisis may confront us at any time.

The one effective means of thus quickly protecting ourselves is to adopt and promptly put into operation such an extensive program of naval construction, as would give us a mighty fleet in the shortest possible time. This would involve a procedure totally different from that advocated by the present administration, which will not result in any increase in the *relative* effectiveness of our navy. We have at present in service only twelve dreadnoughts. We lack battle cruisers and are greatly hampered by lack of proper auxiliaries.

Of battle cruisers and dreadnoughts Japan possesses twelve, Germany twenty-six and Great Britain forty-three.

Our immediate needs involve the laying down of at least eight super-dreadnoughts, together with a proportionate number of battle cruisers, cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries, and their completion in record time. Such a program is of course too extravagant to be made a permanent custom. It is urged as an emergency measure and as the only effective temporary expedient that will tide us over until we have attained the Swiss system in full operation. If properly carried out it would in two or three years double the battle efficiency of our navy.

The necessity for such a program quickly becomes apparent when we con-

sider the condition of our army as it now is. At the present moment * the only adequately trained and organized mobile troops stationed east of the Mississippi are two regiments of regular cavalry and two regiments of regular infantry, a total of about four thousand men. These constitute the sole mobile forces now in that wide area having sufficient tactical cohesion and enough experience in the art of war to withstand the shock of battle.

It would be utterly impossible to place our state militia organizations in any sort of fighting trim in less than six months. Good marksmanship and uncoördinated bravery are in the conflicts of to-day very much at a discount before efficiency and organization.

At the beginning of the present war

* December, 1915.

Great Britain's territorial battalions were probably better trained than the best of our militia regiments, and yet despite the desperate need of reinforcements at the front, no British territorial organization could be brought to a state of efficiency that permitted its use in battle in less than eight months.

It is an axiom in both the German and French armies that troops which have had less than a year's preparation are literally worse than useless, their addition to a weak army only tending to make it still weaker.

From the days when Alexander's crack little army smashed the unnumbered, but untrained, Persian hosts, down to the immediate present, when the Germans, with comparatively small losses, have in a little over a year inflicted six million casualties upon Rus-

sia's unwieldy and disorganized hordes, reliance upon mere numbers has ever been a delusion and a snare.

It has been said that when two forces meet in combat the actual battle merely secures a decision as to the relative values of two completed machines, and their degrees of preparedness for use.

The lay mind grasps the significance of these facts slowly and with difficulty. It does not immediately perceive that since we have 5500 miles of coast line, we must have troops to protect the wide gaps between our isolated coast defenses. Our field army is, as a matter of fact, so insignificant that it could not protect even the flank and rear of our permanent forts. We have therefore no single fixed gun which is safe from a raiding party which might be landed from a hostile fleet.

Two seasoned army corps of 40,000 men, once gaining foothold on our shore, could work their will with us for at least six months. There are several great nations any one of which could within a month land a dozen such corps upon our coast. We must therefore, until we have adopted the Swiss system, make such a disaster as improbable as possible; this can be accomplished only by an immediate and systematic extravagance in naval construction.

# CHAPTER IX

## THE ESSENTIAL BASIS OF ARMY AND NAVY REFORMS

LET us next consider the various steps which would lead upward toward the adoption of the Swiss system, and the attainment of our irreducible minimum of military preparedness.

We find at the very start that our present military system is fundamentally wrong, and that we must have not only an increase in quantity but a radical change in kind.

To begin with, the only firm foundation of efficiency in defense and the necessary first step toward any subsequent

progress is the appointment as secretary of the navy and secretary of war of trained professional men selected for special fitness and proved ability. These most important offices are now conferred as political rewards usually for having assisted in electing a President. A lawyer is invariably chosen as attorney general and a man with banking experience is always selected to fill the post of secretary of treasury, but any faithful political henchman has thus far been considered good enough to be head of the navy or army.

No civilian, be he editor, college president, politician, author, or legislator, is qualified to formulate plans for our national defense or to hold any high military office. The profession of arms is to-day one of the most intricate and technical in existence. Moreover, its

errors are far more costly than those of any other profession. A surgeon who performs unskilfully and unsuccessfully a major operation has only one victim, while a brigade commander who through lack of training makes a serious mistake sacrifices the lives of thousands of men and places his commanding general at a tactical disadvantage that is likely to prove even more costly. The incompetent politician who without any training attempts to plan out the details of a mobilization or to pass upon the efficiency of a naval unit jeopardizes the lives and prosperity of millions of people. Politicians are just as incompetent in military science as they would be without technical education in one of the learned professions. Only the high profession of politics seems to require neither training nor experience.

It is often said that American officers are not altogether unselfish in their desire to see civilians removed from our ministries of defense. Even if this is true, can they be blamed? Would not a member of any other high profession be indignant if through political influence a man untrained in that profession were suddenly to be made autocratic chief over him and all his fellows? Therefore I must maintain that no matter what system of defense we institute or how large a bond issue we declare, we can never have safe and sound reorganization and enlargement of our army and navy until we have military and not civilian secretaries of war and marine as members of the President's cabinet.

No matter how great his ability or how wide his experience in political fields, no statesman lacking special

training in the profession of arms is fitted to act as director of the army or navy.

Without question Abraham Lincoln was the greatest statesman and the noblest patriot that our country has yet produced. No one ever questions his supremacy as a leader or his preëminence as a man of wide and intensely practical knowledge of human affairs. Would that we were to have one half as able as the victor of 1860 to lead us in the campaign of 1916! If any untrained civilian could ever by any possibility have successfully directed military affairs, President Lincoln, coöperating with Mr. Stanton, one of the most competent of our long line of secretaries of war, would certainly have been successful.

What were the facts?

Col. G. R. F. Henderson, one of the foremost authorities on our Civil War, writes that, "In assuming control of the Union armies, Lincoln and Stanton made the Confederates a present of at least 50,000 men."

Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley says: "To hand over to civilians the administration and organization of an army, whether in peace or war, or to allow them to interfere in the selection of officers for command or promotion, is most injurious to efficiency; while during the war, to allow them, no matter how high their political capacity, to dictate to commanders in the field any line of conduct, after the army has once received its commission, is simply to insure disaster. . . . In the first three years of the War of Secession, when Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton practi-

cally controlled the movements of the Federal forces, the Confederates were generally successful . . . the Northern prospects did not begin to brighten until Mr. Lincoln, with that unselfish intelligence which distinguished him, abdicated his military functions in favor of General Grant."

In Grant's memoirs we find the following illuminating passage: "In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me that he never professed to be a military man nor to know how campaigns should be conducted . . . but that pressure forced him into issuing his series of military orders. He did not know but they were all wrong and did know that some of them were.

"He submitted a plan of campaign of his own, which he wanted me to hear and then do as I pleased about it; he

pointed out two streams which emptied into the Potomac, and suggested that the army might be moved in boats and be landed between the mouths of these streams. We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. I listened respectfully but did not suggest that the same streams would protect Lee's flanks, while he shut us up. I did not communicate my plans to the President nor did I to the Secretary of War." * To one who is familiar with the extremely moderate tone in which Grant's memoirs are written, such a statement is doubly convincing.

If Abraham Lincoln, great genius that he was, proved himself incompetent to direct armies in warfare, what would

* Written of an epoch after Lincoln had abdicated his military powers.

happen to us in case of a conflict if our defenses had to be organized by the petty politicians of to-day?

It has been said, "The fool never learns at all, the average man learns from experience, the wise man learns from the experience of others." Let us in the present case try to learn from the experience of others.

Germany, in preparing for the present World War, selected as executive heads of her army those of her general staff-officers who were thought to be most capable. Results have certainly vindicated her judgment.

The very first step deemed necessary by Great Britain after declaring war on Germany was to make Lord Kitchener her minister of war.

In France, General Joffre, before he could begin the Battle of the Marne,

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REAR-ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE

who recently resigned as Aide for Naval Operations.

He graduated from Annapolis, standing second in his class. In 1877 he invented an apparatus for lowering life-boats in a sea-way. In 1889 he invented the famous Fiske telescope sight. In 1896 he invented an electric signal by means of which the alarm is given in water-tight compartments below decks. In 1904 he invented the turret range finder, an optical instrument by means of which an observer may measure his distance from the enemy while protected within a turret.

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JOSEPHUS DANIELS

Grand Admiral of the American Navy

Editor of the Raleigh (North Carolina) "News and Observer." He has been for many years an active Democratic politician. He ably assisted Bryan in nominating Wilson for the presidency.

had to threaten to resign his command in order to force the removal of an interfering and incompetent minister of war. After fifteen months of unsuccessful campaigning, France has been reluctantly compelled to admit that her difficulties had been largely due to civilian interference, and in consequence, after deposing the civilian incumbents, she has appointed General Gallieni minister of war and Rear-Admiral Lacaze minister of marine.

Germany and Italy, the two countries that have most consistently left war preparations to soldiers, are also the countries that have had to undergo fewest defeats and submit to the smallest measure of invasion.

Let us learn by the experience of others, and remove the chieftainships of our army and navy from the category

of political plums. Not only is such a step the first toward better things, but it is one which can be made at once. No antiquated legislation needs to be removed, no new statutes must be passed. Nothing intervenes but the will of a single man.

# CHAPTER X

## ESSENTIAL SUPPLEMENTARY REFORMS

THERE are numerous minor changes which can be made almost as quickly and which tend logically toward the eventual attainment of adequate preparedness.

Not the least of these would be to transfer the command of our state regiments from the hands of the governors to the Federal Government. This would result in the nationalization of the militia, and would be a distinct step in the right direction. It would allow the militia of the various States to serve their country directly, without the services of forty-eight middlemen. It

would result in unification and standardization and in a more efficient body of trained civilian officers. To make the militia a national army would be a step toward making it a national army of the Swiss and Australian type.

To secure for the militia the best element of our population—the hard-working, clear-thinking, wage-earning, plain citizen—we must recognize the unfairness and injustice of trying to force a self-respecting workman to discipline his fellow-workers. We must cease to demand of our state regiments that they render strike duty.

This is the chief obstacle to enlistment, for the better class of workingmen will not volunteer for a service that may at some time oblige them to shoot down their fellow-workmen. An ideal citizen is the man who is a good soldier

in time of war, and an active participant in political and economic problems in time of peace. But if he fulfils the second of these two requirements, he is and should be partizan; and if he is forced to perform the duties which properly belong to a state police force like the gendarmerie of France or the Royal Northwestern Mounted Police of Canada, he either hesitates to suppress his confederates or is tempted to oppress his antagonists. A good citizen may logically be a soldier *or* a policeman; he cannot justly be both at once. This is so generally recognized in European armies that they have their own police forces, which as a rule do no fighting.

One of the most necessary items of Preparedness for the United States is the development of its Sanitary Corps. Wars are now won not so much by the

numbers of the enemy who are killed, as by the numbers of one's own men who can be kept fit and in the field of action. The most important duty of the medical corps is not to care for the sick and the wounded but to superintend the general hygienic conditions of the army in service. The Japanese, in their war with Russia, gave the most admirable demonstration of efficiency in caring for the health of their men, and our own United States is on record as having shown the most inexcusable, almost criminal neglect of its soldiers during the Spanish-American war. Both stories have often been told but, unfortunately for us, they will be retold as long as sanitation of armies is discussed, or histories of wars written.

Disgraceful as our own record was, it is not wise for us to thrust it out of

mind until we have first learned the lessons it can teach us of the evils of the volunteer system and conversely of the need of Preparedness.

In wars before the Japanese-Russian conflict the average number of deaths by disease was to those killed in battle in proportion as four to one. In our own little affair with Spain, it rose to fourteen to one. The Japanese in their war with China had lost nearly the general average of four dead of disease for one killed in battle. Ten years later in the Russian war, however, they by adequate development of their medical corps, reversed these figures and instead of having sixteen die of sickness to four who died of wounds, they had only one who died of disease for four of wounds—or a decrease of 1,600 per cent. The Japanese army in the field is

supposed to have averaged about 600,000 men. Of these, a little less than 9 per cent. or about 53,000 were killed in battle or died of wounds received in battle while those who were lost by disease numbered only 12,000. If the average of former wars had been maintained 262,000 of their soldiers would have died of illness. If they had approached the average of our record of the Spanish war, disease would have destroyed their entire army. In a war where they were opposed by a nation so overwhelmingly superior in numbers as Russia and which commanded almost unlimited resources, the low rate of deaths by disease was an element so important that without it the Japanese could never have won the war. No matter how great their courage, or however perfect the purely military side of

their preparations for the conflict, the loss of those 262,000 men, who were saved to the army by sanitary precautions, would certainly have turned the tide against them. It was because the Japanese so clearly realized this, because they had worked out the startling fact that an army in active service kills by neglect many more of its own men than it destroys of the enemy that it concentrated so much of its effort in preparation on the medical aspect.

It is important that the heads of the army and navy should have the privilege of the floor in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. It is ludicrous that only roundabout and unofficial means of communication are available for information and conference between the legislative and defensive branches of our Government.

The enlargement of West Point would be another distinct step in the right direction, for that institution now furnishes us with only one-third the officers who are needed for even our present diminutive army. It would help matters if the entrance tests were less severe and the "trying out" during the first year more crucial, thus eliminating undesirables by real rather than by artificial tests for military aptitude. It would be an improvement if admission depended upon nation-wide competitive examinations, instead of being made by congressional appointment.

The effectiveness of even our diminutive army is further reduced by the fact that it is scattered about across the continent in some fifty unrelated and useless little army posts. That our land forces do not attract to their enlisted

ranks the best class of young men is due to the fact that service in insignificant army posts, situated "back home" in some congressman's bailiwick can not be other than unattractive. For purely political reasons we possess so many army posts, for so few soldiers, that a great part of the enlisted man's time must be spent not in studying his profession but in the upkeep of the buildings and grounds; grass cutting is substituted for rifle practice, and shoveling snow for manœuvers.

Secretary Garrison's plan to establish a volunteer continental army of 400,000 men is impractical. In addition, it is founded on false principles. It is not only the right, but the duty, of every citizen to defend his country. In the present day and generation one cannot defend his country unless one has

been suitably prepared and trained. Therefore such preparation should be general and compulsory. Pericles said, "If ye would save your country, ye must go and stand in the ranks yourselves." It is as unpatriotic and undemocratic to hire men to fight for us as it would be to hire them to vote for us. The only good thing that can be said for the Garrison plan is that anything would be better than what we now have.

# CHAPTER XI

## THE NATION ON TRIAL

IT is to be hoped that the present administration will not continue to support the policy which brought us disaster in 1812 and which was responsible for the occurrence of the Civil War. If it does decide to continue in its dilatory tactics, it will, in order to hold its prestige, be forced by public sentiment at least to seem to do something. It must create the impression that it labors in the cause of preparedness if only in order to lessen the chance that its opponents in the next election will make preparedness the dominant issue. To steal the thunder of its ad-

versaries, it may make trivial changes in our present army and navy and thereafter point with pride to its efforts in the cause of preparedness.

It is perhaps too early to determine whether the present administration is really trying to bring about a state of adequate preparedness, or if its leaders, asleep to the needs of the country, are merely embarking upon a voyage of compromises and subterfuges. Results are always the final test. Mr. Wilson came into office a teacher and a theorist, with little of that experience called "practical." He apparently believed that wars are things of the past. His administration officially recommended that it might be well to use our battleships to carry the mails, or as public training schools for boys.

To-day he evidently feels that, no

matter what wicked deeds foreign nations may be perpetrating, for the United States at least war is an anachronism. The nation is growing more and more out of sympathy with his present policy.

The other members of the administration do not altogether command public confidence; one especially mistrusts any who belong to the Bryan faction, of whom Josephus Daniels is but one example. Mr. Daniels is an exceedingly shrewd and expert politician. It would be a mistake to measure his general political ability by his ignorance of naval affairs. Few political tricks are unknown to this man, who was a faithful follower of Bryan during sixteen unfruitful years.

He is suspected of several clever

ruses the object of which is to abate without satisfying the public clamor for preparedness. His demand for fifty small so-called coast-defense submarines is an example. In point of fact the day of toy submarines is past, and the era of submersible cruisers, which can attack the enemy's battle-ships upon the high seas, or voyage unaccompanied from the Kiel Canal to the Hellespont, has begun. Even Mr. Daniels must know that until we can build up an adequate army the only way to protect ourselves from invasion is to dominate the ocean between us and possible enemies, and that once our inadequate fleet was sunk or driven into harbors, no number of small submarines could prevent a landing from being made somewhere along our 5500 miles of coast line. Germany's fleet of submarines has yet

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PRESIDENT EMERITUS CHARLES W. ELIOT
Preparationist

to sink a single British transport carrying troops to the ports of Calais and Boulogne, and even if transports had been sunk, the landing of other troops would not thereby have been prevented, for it is a soldier's duty to take risks. Moreover, the safe bases of the German submarines would within a week be destroyed by British landing parties were it not for the German army, which protects them.

Great Britain has been saved from invasion not by submarines and coast defense vessels but by her capital ships which alone control the seas. This lesson is one for America soberly and seriously to consider.

During the last decade our naval policy has been renewed year by year. In that time we have built battle-ships at a rate of approximately two and a half

a year, and no single Congress has ever received credit for authorizing more than three capital ships. The keen political mind of Daniels evidently perceived a chance to befog the issue of 1916 by placing before Congress a bill demanding the building of twenty battle-ships in the next eight years. He thus creates the impression that he is about to construct twenty battle-ships when, as a matter of fact, he is merely recommending the perpetuation for eight years to come of the totally inadequate rate of increase of the last decade!

It is true that the size of the battle-ships we build is constantly being enlarged, but this fact is not significant since the rate of increase in the ships of other nations is even greater.

President Wilson's last message to

Congress, recommended the building of only *ten* battle-ships, in the next five years; whereby in effect *he approves the building of even fewer battle-ships in future than we have per year averaged to add to our navy in the past.*

Dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts are technically classed as capital ships. These carry at least eight modern high-power big guns, and are able to steam twenty-one or more knots an hour. Of such ships Great Britain has forty-three, Germany twenty-six and Japan twelve. We have only twelve at present in service. Sea control absolutely depends upon the possession of these ships. Our obsolete battle-ships, which carry four old type guns and steam only seventeen or eighteen knots, can in no way affect sea supremacy. Such ships are useless ex-

cept to a navy which already controls the ocean, in which case they are of service for patrol or blockade duty.

One reason that capital ships are necessary to maintain sea control is explained by the simple fact that in battle a ship having great speed and long-range guns can choose and maintain just that distance which will permit her to pound a smaller ship to pieces, while remaining herself outside the range of that enemy's less powerful guns.

Although we possess some first-class capital ships, in war time these would be almost hopelessly handicaped by our lack of proper auxiliaries. Four foreign nations each own battle-cruisers which carry eight high-power guns and can steam more than thirty-one knots an hour. We have no battle-cruisers

either built or authorized. We have no scout cruisers less than ten years old. In the Battle of the North Sea the cruiser *Blücher* was sunk by the British because she could not exceed a speed of twenty-six knots an hour. We have no cruiser that can approach twenty-four. Although our navy list contains the names of sixty-two destroyers, a score of these were built fifteen years ago, and we have only three which can make more than thirty-one knots an hour. The enemy's battle-cruisers would run down the others as a wolf runs down sheep.

Nine voters out of ten, however, are to-day fooled by clever sophistry like that of Mr. Daniels. This will, we trust, by November, 1916, no longer be the case, for even to-day thousands of men of prominence and power who less than a year ago were indifferent or op-

posed to any increase of army or navy are to-day better informed and are joining the general cry for an adequate defense which shall be in proportion to our wealth and population, and numbered with due regard to the dangers which now walk abroad.

Six months ago any one who talked about a foe invading America was considered sensational; to-day the majority of our most thoughtful, educated citizens are ready to accept the possibility of war, and are eager to make due preparation to prevent it.

The reconstruction of our army and our navy, however, even though it is attempted with vast appropriations of money and countless numbers of men, will not of necessity give us an effective army or an efficient navy. All the wars in history have proved that it

is always organization and discipline which win against numbers. At this moment preparation for defense has already become in the minds of the majority the one great national problem, the rational solution of which will in the next few years elect presidents, develop statesmen, and undermine many a popular politician. Even now laggards are running to cover or hastening to enlist in the popular cause.

In the early forties, my great-uncle, George Bradburn, the anti-slavery orator, was often pelted with rotten eggs and cabbages because he spoke for abolition. On such occasions he used to cry: "Gentlemen, if you wish fame, join us now; to-morrow the cause will have grown popular, and even rascals will be with us. The mob will then cheer what it now hisses." It is the

duty of our public men to interest themselves in the question of national defense now while their help is all important; to-morrow all creation will cry, "Prepare!"

It is not alone the politicians who must concern themselves in the matter, but the citizens of the nation. National defense is every man's business and every man's duty. The fatal mistakes that Congress has heretofore made in managing military affairs, and the reckless waste of public funds voted for military equipment, would not have been possible if the public had taken greater personal interest in the army and navy and kept informed as to the use of national appropriations. Our army costs one hundred times as much per man available for defensive duty as the Swiss army, and is far less efficient and less

ready for emergencies. For this the nation is now on trial.

If our present leaders will not make any of the basic moves which might lead to better things; if they will not nationalize the militia, if they will not quadruple the capacity of West Point, if they will not give the heads of the army and navy the privilege of the floor in the House and Senate, if they will not eliminate strike duty for militia, if they will not abolish the forty useless and expensive little army posts, which were established and are maintained for pork-barrel purposes, if they will not appoint proper ministers of war and marine, and, above all, if they persist in political subterfuges, then they must not be allowed to remain in power. They must be overwhelmingly defeated in 1916. That election will then be the

first time since 1860 upon which has depended the fate of our nation.

I am advised by legal authorities that Section Eight of the First Article of the Constitution, which empowers the National Congress to raise and support armies, gives Congress, by virtue of subsequent interpretations, all the authority necessary to institute in the United States the Swiss system of general compulsory service, or any other military system deemed necessary, without the delay of referring the matter to the vote of the individual States.

This fact has a most vital bearing on the fate of the United States. It signifies that if one of the contending political parties, in the Presidential election of 1916, makes the question of adequate military preparedness its platform and wins a decisive victory, the

Congress then elected can within a few months pass all enactments necessary for the institution of general military service, adequate national defense, and valid peace insurance.

As matters stand to-day, our nation is doomed to irretrievable disaster in its next war.

No sacrifices made after the hour has struck will avail to save us.

It is not upon the battle-fields of that war that our national existence is to be saved, but in the next Presidential campaign.

*Aux armes, citoyens! Formez vos bataillons!*

## CONCLUSION

IT is not only the right but the duty of all able-bodied citizens to defend their native land. Modern warfare, however, is waged in a manner so intricate and so scientific that it is impossible for untrained individuals to help defend their country. Therefore military training should be universal. To be universal it must be compulsory. Therefore the United States should adopt a system of universal compulsory training. This system should be patterned upon those of Switzerland and Australia, since these have proved adequate without being unduly burdensome to citizens, and since they make

provision for defense only and do not contemplate attacks upon neighboring nations. Our system should be planned out by those of our countrymen who have devoted their lives to the study and practice of military matters, and not by party politicians.

# APPENDIX

# APPENDIX

## PUBLIC OPINION ON PREPAREDNESS

*New York Times, December 5, 1914.*

IT was made clear to-day that the influence of President Wilson and his Administration would be opposed to the proposal of Representative Augustus P. Gardner of Massachusetts for a public enquiry by a commission of Congress into the allegations that the naval and military forces of the United States were not prepared for war. Representative Sherley of Kentucky, chairman of the Committee on Fortifications, will lead the opposition in the House of Representatives and it is already ap-

parent that he will have the backing of several of the Democratic leaders in that body.

The President is understood to be of the opinion that no good can be accomplished at this uncertain time by a sensational agitation of this topic. . . . the President . . . will be disposed to oppose anything that savors of a propaganda to give the country the impression that from a military and naval viewpoint the United States is in a bad way.

Representative Gardner's demand for a hearing on his resolution for an investigation into the military preparedness of the country was voted down to-day by the House Rules Committee by a straight party vote of five to three. All the Democrats voted against it.

—*New York Times, December 13, 1914.*

Mr. Gardner before the House Naval Committee, December 10, declared that "if war were to break out to-day, it would be found that our coast defenses had not sufficient ammunition for an hour's fighting.

" 'We must depend in every time of national peril, upon citizenry trained and accustomed to arms,' says the President.

"But how are we to get enough citizenry, as he calls us ordinary people? Does the President realize that there are only 120,000 militiamen in this whole nation? Does he understand that 23,000 of them did not even appear last year for annual inspection? Does he know that 31,000 did not appear at the annual encampment? Is he aware that 53,000, or nearly half of this citizenry, never appeared at the rifle

range during the whole course of last year? Where is this citizenry to get the weapons of war? According to the last report of the Chief of the Staff we are short 316 field guns and 1,322,384 rounds of ammunition necessary to equip our militia in time of war. Last year General Wood asked for enough guns and ammunition to bring the United States up to the standard of Bulgaria. That immodest demand was gently but firmly rejected.

"The statement that we have only enough field artillery ammunition to last for a single day's battle if all our guns were engaged was made to me by one of the highest officers in the United States army. The Chief of the Staff tells us that the ammunition for the coast defense mortars would last one-half hour, and for the coast

defense guns three quarters of an hour."

—*New York Times, December 11, 1914.*

Secretary Daniels, at a luncheon following the launching of the U. S. ship *Pennsylvania,* said: "There never was a time when the navy was so powerful, so ready, so efficient, as now."

Rear-Admiral Bradley Allen Fiske, Aid for Operations in the Navy Department. "Resigned" April, 1915. Previously he had made certain statements to the House Committee on Navy Affairs.

These statements did not jibe with some previously made by Secretary Daniels. Among the remarks made by Admiral Fiske were the following ones:

"I think it is well known that we are behind other nations in mines and air-

craft and that in case of an attack upon our coasts the need would be keenly felt. If we should become involved in war we might be attacked very quickly, possibly in the vicinity of New York.

"Every navy with the exception of our own has an organization that is thoroughly military. Every possible contingency has been carefully worked out and provided for, and the game of war is changed from time to time as conditions change. The Admiralties in charge of the navies of other countries keep them up to a stage of war at all times, and the general organization is as complete as the general organization of the individual ship. Every nation that has a navy, including Argentina, handles that branch of the service through a general staff, with the sole exception of the United States."

In answer to a question of Mr. Roberts: "Then if we have a war to-morrow we must handle our navy in a haphazard way?" he answered, "Yes, that is true."

In answer to the question: "How near New York City would a hostile fleet have to come to use its aircraft in dropping bombs on that city?" he replied: "They could direct them from quite a distance out in the ocean, and I think they could probably send them in from four hundred to five hundred miles."

Admiral Fiske further stated *that it would take from three to five years to put the navy of the United States into serviceable condition.*

He said, "Twenty-one ships of our battle fleet and some destroyers are efficiently manned, but there are not suf-

ficient officers and enlisted men to man our other ships.

"The gunnery of other nations is superior to our own—a very small difference in gunnery might turn the tide of battle if we ever come in contact with an enemy.

"We have one mine layer. We need five additional mine layers. On board that one mine layer are only three hundred and thirty-six mines. Germany had twenty thousand mines when the war started."

Washington, Feb. 14.—The deficiency of the United States navy in submarines of the type which is creating havoc in the European war was emphasized to-day before the House Naval Affairs Committee by Rear Admiral Grant, in charge of submarines,

and by Capt. J. S. McKean, assistant for material.

"Three U boats—the late German type—costing $2,500,000," said Admiral Grant, "are as effective as twenty-two K boats"—the American type —"costing $10,000,000.

"For months the U boats have operated from Heligoland as a base to a cruising ground off the coast of Ireland, a distance of 1,350 miles. They are supposed to make twenty knots, but their operating speed is probably seventeen or eighteen. The U boats covered the distance both ways and remained twenty-one days on the cruising grounds unless they used up their torpedoes. . . .

Mr. Britten wanted to know why if three U boats were the equal of twenty-two K boats the Navy Department had

within two months awarded contracts for sixteen of the latter.

"Because," interrupted Chairman Padgett, "Congress specified there should be sixteen boats built and that they should not cost more than $550,000. . . ."

One reason for the length of time—two years—required to build a submarine in the United States, Capt. McKean explained, was the inability of the Navy Department to enforce penalties.

"As soon as a more profitable job comes along," he said, "the contractor sidesteps the navy job. There has not been a penalty imposed for loss of time on warship construction but has sooner or later been rebated by Congress."

—*New York Sun, February 15, 1916.*

Admiral Dewey has said, "It cannot be too often repeated that ships without a trained personnel to man and fight them are useless for the purposes of war. The training needed for the purpose is long and arduous and cannot be done after the outbreak of war. This must have been provided for long previous to the beginning of hostilities. Any ship of the fleet found at the outbreak of war without provision having been made for its manning by officers and men trained for the service can be counted as only a useless mass of steel whose existence leads only to a false security."

Captain Gardner of the navy has said: "The truth of the matter is that the United States navy instead of making any important advance is deteriorating relatively compared with the navies

of other nations. We lack scout submarines, aeroplanes and ammunitions.

"Eighty fighting vessels of our modest navy are not available for battle."

According to Rear Admiral Badger the building plan advocated by the navy general board in 1903 was designed to keep the United States ahead of Germany in naval strength. But Germany happened to be better represented in Congress than the United States and the plan was not adopted.

—*Springfield Union.*

*Claude Kitchin of North Carolina, floor leader of the House of Representatives, gives reasons for his opposition to Wilson's program.*

"This sudden, radical, and stupendous move for war preparations is going to shock the civilized world. The

militarists and war traffickers of every nation will point to our conduct as a reason why they should renew war preparations on a larger scale than ever before, on a scale limited only by the ability of the nations undertaking it.

"However our own people may remain in ignorance of the terrible seriousness of the preparedness program, every other country will feel convinced that in this tremendous self-imposed burden upon our resources we have other designs than mere self-defense.

"They know, if our people do not, that our navy to-day is twice as large as Japan's, and that it is far superior to that of Germany. This is the absolute fact, and it is not to be lied away by such a false and deceitful publication as the 'Navy Year Book,' which is issued by our Navy Department, or by any

statements of the so-called 'patriotic' defense leagues that are now playing the game of the war traffickers and the people who want to make their millions by the sale of munitions to our Government. I cannot listen with any patience whatever to this talk that we are unprepared, because I know from personal experience in Congress and by long study that this is not the case."

—*New York Times, November 19, 1915.*

There was great rejoicing throughout the navy not long ago when it was announced that a sum approximately $2,000,000 was available from previous appropriations for the purchase of a modern vessel to supplant the hospital ship *Solace* which has long been recognized as hopelessly inadequate for the needs of our modern fleet.

This rejoicing was short lived, for it was learned that because of his great solicitude lest America should be suspected of war-like preparations, Secretary Bryan had vetoed the proposal and the plan to provide a properly equipped haven for the sick men in the service was abandoned.

According to naval officers familiar with the circumstances, Secretary of the Navy Daniels was talking with Secretary of State Bryan when he happened to mention that the fleet was about to get a new hospital ship and that it would be paid for and equipped with money that was available from the savings of bureaus in the Navy Department. The Secretary of State frowned upon the proposal, promptly asserting that in his opinion it would be an unwise move to acquire such a vessel since to do so might

create the impression that the United States was preparing for trouble somewhere.

"General Boards of the navy have advised, time and time again," a naval officer said yesterday, "the construction of a hospital ship worthy of the service, but up to the present Congress has not seen fit to pass the legislation that would make possible this much needed addition to the greatest of American fleets.

"Immediately following the occupation of Vera Cruz by naval forces under Admiral Fletcher last April, which cost the fleet nineteen lives and scores of wounded bluejackets and marines, the fact that the naval service was badly off so far as fleet hospital equipment was concerned, was brought home forcibly to the authorities of Washington. It

was admitted on all sides that the situation demanded immediate attention.

"Naval officers thereupon began to look about for a way to give the fleet a fit hospital ship. It was found that upward of $2,000,000 was available from previous naval appropriations which, under the law, could be used to purchase a modern liner, and that enough money would be left over to pay for the transformation of the liner from a passenger ship to a hospital ship. The proposal was submitted to Secretary of the Navy Daniels, and he approved it and told officers to go ahead. Surgeon Theodore W. Richards, one of the best-known medical officers in the navy, was selected to superintend the conversion of the liner into a hospital ship, and he came to New York with approved plans in his possession. The ship selected was one

of the best vessels of the Ward line."

Now that the navy's dream of a proper floating hospital has been shattered, the *Solace,* a ship of only 3300 tons, twenty years old, and very much the worse for wear, is being made ready so far as it is possible to do so, to accompany the Atlantic Fleet on its annual winter exercises off Guantanamo.

—*New York Times, January 11, 1915.*

"In the first place," said Mr. Daniels, "if we eliminate from consideration the three dreadnoughts authorized and the proceeds from the sale of the *Mississippi* and the *Idaho* to Greece we have a balance available from previous appropriations and the total to be expended in building this year would be $44,091,000. We shall spend $5,000,000 more than we did last year. Now

as to building dreadnoughts in case of emergency, it is the present policy to equip the navy yards so that they can build battleships. The New York Yard is now prepared to carry on the building of two dreadnoughts at once. We are going to build submarines at the Portsmouth Yard and we can build various auxiliaries at Philadelphia, Boston, and Norfolk."

"How many dreadnoughts," asked Mr. Butler, "could we build after we got into a war?"

"The private yards that contract for battleships have a known capacity," said the Secretary. "The Cramps can build two at a time. The Newport News Shipbuilding Company could do the same, the Fore River Yard a like number, and the New York Ship Building Company the same."

Mr. Browning of New Jersey interrupted to say that the New York Ship Building Company had three slips and could build three dreadnoughts at one time. Two of these slips, he said, were covered so that construction could proceed more rapidly.

"The New York Yard," continued the Secretary, "could build one ship certainly and probably two. That would make ten ships that could be under construction in case of emergency. No yard on the Pacific coast could build even one battleship. Mare Island Yard is not fitted for it, and it would require dredging out the channel to make it possible there. At Bremerton, with some expenditure of money, preparation could be made for building a dreadnought, but that would be out of the question as an emergency measure.

League Island at Philadelphia can now build a transport but it would be necessary to enlarge the slip there to lay down a battleship. I hope to be able to recommend next year that the yard there be improved so a battleship can be built there. Under pressure it would appear we can build ten dreadnoughts at one time in the country."

"How far can we depend on getting them built in time to use them in a war in which we might be engaged?" asked Mr. Roberts.

"That all depends on the length of the war. If it was two years long we could not get them: if three we could," replied the Secretary.

—*New York Times, December 12, 1914.*

Coming to the subject of aviation, for which branch of the service the general

Board urges an appropriation of $5,000,000, Secretary Daniels said:

"I appointed a board on aviation a year ago, and we went on and established an aviation school at Pensacola. We have tried to get a good type of machine, but so far have not succeeded. If I had $5,000,000 now I could not spend it. I think that if we get a successful aeroplane we shall have to build it ourselves. I would not now advise setting up a plant to do so, but we should have to provide a plant ultimately, I think. All we need now we can spend under the appropriation of $300,000 provided in the allowances for the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Steam Engineering. At present the money might better be spent in experimentation. Next winter we may be able to present a program."

"Well, Mr. Secretary," said Mr. Roberts with an accent of irritation, "we have in all, in both services but twenty-three aeroplanes, and Great Britain has 1400 aeroplanes and 12 dirigibles; Germany has 1400 aeroplanes and 60 dirigibles; Russia has 1000 aeroplanes and 20 dirigibles; France has 900 aeroplanes and 30 dirigibles; even Belgium has 60 aeroplanes. Austria has 600 aeroplanes and 8 dirigibles. There is no great hope we shall ever get what we need in this matter unless the department makes progress and is pushed from this end."

—*New York Times, December 12, 1914.*

General Wood said in December, 1914, before the House Military Committee: "We have enough field guns for an army of 40,000 men and a sup-

ply of field ammunition which would last one complete day."

The concentration of our army on the Mexican border in 1911, required two weeks. The Germans mobilized 1,500,000 in two weeks last August. There is not in the United States a single one of the heavy field mortars which have played such an important part in the European war.

No provision has been made for ammunition trains.

*Major-General Leonard Wood's Address to members of Technology Club, Gramercy Park.*

"We have got to make a lot of officers," said General Wood. "I do not think that the people realize how few we have. All told the number of line

officers in the United States, and the figures include those of the National Guard as well as those of the regular army, do not total much more than 11,000 men, whereas for an army of 1,000,000 men we would need at least 35,000."

—*New York Times, October 28, 1915.*

*J. H. Hammond, Jr.*

The peoples of Europe regard the general attitude in this country toward preparedness as one of the inexplicable results of the war, according to John Hays Hammond, Jr., who discussed last night the Ford peace ship and the duty of the United States in the present crisis. He has just returned from England and France, after spending two months there in conference with the naval and military authorities.

"No one in Europe can understand

how there can be the necessity for a campaign for preparedness here," he said. "They seem to think that the calamity that has befallen England, France, and Russia should be sufficient argument to show the people here that preparedness is an absolute necessity of national existence.

"The navies of England and Germany will be twice as strong at the end of next year, while that of the United States, even if the outlined plans are carried out, will only occupy the same relative position as it does now. Then there is the naval program being carried out by Japan. Their navy is being rapidly and greatly increased. All I can say is that it is significant to compare the programs of the United States and that country.

"It seems needless to comment on the

anti-preparedness or peace campaign being carried on by Henry Ford and Bryan. Two weeks at the front, anywhere in Europe—two weeks in England or France—would show them that their peace proposal is absurd.

"The people of Europe are thinking of anything but peace, and I predict that Mr. Ford's peace ship and peace envoys will meet with a very frosty reception. The national spirits of the various countries of Europe have been aroused—of Germany, as well as the Allies. There is no national spirit here, as the opposition to the preparedness campaign has shown. It seems as though only war will bring it out."

—*New York Times, November 26, 1915.*

He's a kindly innovator,
And his gentleness atones

For the rudeness of Decatur
  And of John Paul Jones.

And he wouldn't dream of choosing
  A belligerent recruit;
And we mustn't go a-cruising
  And we must not shoot;

So in amity befitting
  A community of nuns
We are sitting at our knitting
  On the twelve-inch guns.

—*Arthur Guiterman in "Life."*

*Dr. John Grier Hibben, President Princeton. Twenty-first Lake Mohonk Conference on National Arbitration in May, 1915.*

"I do not advocate preparedness for war," he said, "but a preparedness against war—a preparedness which in

the event of the catastrophe of war itself will prevent the enormous initial sacrifice of human lives which has characterized every war in which the United States has been engaged throughout our past history.

"No one," he declared, "can be so blind regarding the significance of present conditions as to take the position that a grave national emergency is not at least a possibility.

"I am not in sympathy with the peace propaganda which is being prosecuted in many of our schools, so far, at least, as it endeavors to quicken the peace sentiment by impressing upon the minds of the young children the horrors or the economical losses of war. . . .

"By all means let us pay any price which can buy peace—restraint of passion, long sufferance, sacrifice of ma-

terial wealth or of every personal convenience and comfort. Let us sacrifice it all, everything which can buy peace. But let us not forget that there are some things which cannot buy peace. If we sacrifice them in order to secure peace, the peace thus sought becomes for us the veriest torment of a living hell. We dare not trade honor for peace, we dare not betray duty in order that we may bargain for peace. We dare not indulge ourselves in the enjoyment of the blessings of peace while we turn deaf ears to the cry of distress or to the summons of a righteous cause."

Never in the twenty-one years of its existence had the Lake Mohonk Conference heard such a call to arms. The Princeton president's appeal aroused intense interest and discussion among

the more than two hundred delegates here from all parts of the country.

*Roosevelt after reading Wilson anent the Lusitania.*

Asked if he cared to make any comment upon the speech of the President, Mr. Roosevelt said:

"I think that China is entitled to draw all the comfort she can from this statement, and it would be well for the United States to ponder seriously what the effect upon China has been of managing her foreign affairs during the last fifteen years on theory thus enunciated.

"If the United States is satisfied with occupying some time in the future the precise international position that China now occupies, then the United States can afford to act on this theory. But it cannot act on this theory if it de-

sires to retain or regain the position won for it by the men who fought under Washington and by the men who, in the days of Abraham Lincoln, wore the blue under Grant and the gray under Lee. . . ."

—*New York Times, May 12, 1915.*

*Rev. Dr. Malcolm James MacLeod, Collegiate Church of St. Nicholas, Forty-eighth Street. Thanksgiving Day Sermon on Preparedness.*

"I am sorry to confess that I am not an optimist in believing that world peace is not far away. The old prophets looked forward to a time when swords would be beaten into plowshares, but 2500 years have passed and we seem to be a long way from it yet. No military victory is going to bring it about. Nothing is going to bring it

about but a change in the hearts of the people.

"We hear much about the dangers of militarism. There is as much danger of militarism in our country as there is of feudalism or the divine right of kings. Militarism is wicked. No true American wants it. But cowardly acquiescence in wrong is infinitely more wicked. It is possible for a nation to experience the loss of national self-respect.

"I do not believe we should trust the safety of the institutions that we love to the kindness of heart of any sultan or czar or mikado, or king, or kaiser. We have read of shocking crimes during the year that would have made a black Hottentot blush; helpless mothers with their babies slaughtered; American citizens drowned; the American

flag treated with contempt; 800,000 Armenians exterminated. And what have we done to correct all these horrors? What are patience's limits? 'How long, O Lord, how long?'

"I am a man of peace. I love peace; but I have learned, too, that there are times when soft words have no weight. I believe in Christian meekness, but I think when you're dealing with pagans Christian meekness is folderol. I believe in nonresistance when my own interests are concerned, but I do not believe in nonresistance when my family and my home are at stake. Then I believe in vigorous resistance. If a bully abuses my child I'm not too proud to fight, and I'm not going to write him any letters. I want to thrash him. Jesus used a scourge. We insure against fire, why not insure against the

greatest calamity that ever cursed mankind? The nation that refuses to safeguard its homes and stand up for the poor and oppressed, or to champion the cause of righteousness and justice is not worthy of its liberty. It ought to be enslaved."

—*New York Times, November 26, 1915.*

*Plaza Dinner. Dr. I. Iyenaga, Japanese Professor.*

The failure of Americans to understand the position of Japan in the Far East is likely to result in a more serious situation than that caused by the "Japan-California controversy," Dr. I. Iyenaga, professor of history at the University of Chicago, told prominent Americans and Japanese at a dinner given at the Hotel Plaza last night by Major George Haven Putnam, Charles

A. Coffin, Lindsay Russell, and Emerson McMillin.

"After all the golden words for Japan which I have heard from so many distinguished Americans," he said, "I don't know if it is right for me to speak bluntly, but the chairman has asked me to speak, and it would be discourteous of me to remain silent. Even at the height of the California-Japanese controversy, that affair appeared to me as less serious than the matter which has been before us in the past few weeks. Until Japan and America come to a better understanding and until Americans see and appreciate the position of Japan in the Far East, I am afraid that it will be a little more serious than at present.

"You know that Japan is only about one half the size of Texas and has a population about two thirds of that of

the United States. Now what are we going to do? How is our nation going to continue to exist in so small a territory? We are advised to promote industries and create wealth. We are doing that as well as we can, but our resources are limited."

—*New York Times, May 20, 1915.*

"With regard to matters of national defense, a single day's neglect may involve a century's regret. I shall economize in the expenses of my household and thereby be able to contribute (to national defense) . . . the sum of 300,000 yen annually."

—*The late Emperor Mutsuhito.*

*George Bronson Rea in The Pittsburgh Gazette-Times.*

. . . The navy of Japan is being rapidly expanded in accordance with a

fixed and unalterable plan. At the end of the war with Russia in 1905, the Japanese navy had an effective 264,000 tons; in 1914, 459,630 tons. This year's (1915) actual work increases this strength by the completion of a gigantic battleship of 33,000 tons with 22 knots' speed, as well as two great battle cruisers, each of 27 knots and 27,500 tons, and a number of smaller craft, while other formidable battleships of over 30,000 tons each are in course of construction. Though the naval plans are avowedly secret, enough is known to certify that the program includes the construction of four superdreadnaughts, 24 destroyers, two scout ships and eight submarines. An appropriation of approximately $100,000,000 to defray the cost of this increase was passed by the Diet in July of this year

(1915). This will complete the new fleet of eight dreadnaughts, eight battle cruisers, six scout ships, 64 destroyers, 24 submarines, together with transport, supply and repair ships.

Count Okuma, the president of the Japan Peace Society, the ally of the pacifists in America, . . . earnestly and loudly talks of peace, but strenuously prepares for war. He is the protagonist of preparedness. On the one hand, he assures the American peace delegates of his love of peace, and on the other preaches militarism and the duty and mission of Japan to his people. While his American admirers, relying on his sincerity, are advocating peace and arbitration treaties, The Hague Tribunal and other remedies for universal peace, and doing their utmost to maintain their own country in a per-

manent state of military inferiority, Count Okuma tells his own people that "diplomacy to be really effective and successful must be backed up by force." Time and again he has given utterance to this firm policy, although no reference to it has reached America.

In a speech to the political leaders of Japan at his residence on October 28, 1914, he said: "But it must be contended that armament, that most vital question of a nation, cannot be neglected even for a day, for the sake of diplomacy."

The recent statement in the Hochi in connection with the report that the United States was getting ready to intervene in Mexico, brings the story up to date. "As for Japan, unless we have four more battleships of the dread-

naught type, in addition to what we already have, we may not be able to interfere. We regret that we shall merely have to watch the unfettered actions of the United States."

Compare this program and policy with that of the United States. Parallel the statements of the Emperor of Japan, Count Okuma and other leading officials of the empire with the talk of the pacifists in America. Actions speak louder than words. Words are uttered merely to conceal thought in Japan. Japan talks peace, but her plans for military and naval expansion are unalterable. The late emperor set the program. . . . What, then, does the peace talk in Japan amount to? What does the smile on the face of Japan signify?

*Reuterdahl in the "Metropolitan."*

His (Daniels') management, or mismanagement, rather, of the American Navy is the saddest and most expensive joke in the annals of our sea history. The damning evidence of Admiral Fletcher's report, suppressed for five months by Daniels, comes as final proof.

*Nathan Straus addressing 2nd Convention of Laymen's Efficiency League.*

"In the last analysis is there anything at all in this war but miserable, contemptible brawl between the two biggest powers? And is there any reason at all for this war except that there was no concert or community among nations sufficiently powerful to prevent it?

"Now, the power to do this thing—the power to prevent war—can be achieved only by the most thorough

preparedness on the part of the nations that want peace and order in the world. This, I maintain, is the overwhelming reason why America should have a powerful navy and a strong army, and the thorough equipment essential to the efficient use of this power.

"We need preparedness—not to fight battles, but to prevent battles being fought. We need preparedness, not to defend this nation against foes, but to compel and guarantee world peace. And America alone of all the nations is in the position to make such use of power as will curb and control the bickering, jealous nations that keep this world in such turmoil.

"I deny emphatically that preparedness leads to war. I assert with deep conviction that thorough preparedness on the part of America will be the best

guarantee that the world can have that there will be no more wars.

"It is the duty of our Government, concentrated on the welfare of the United States, to make such preparations and authorize such expenditures as will save us from the experience, the horrors inflicted upon the nations of Europe.

"I believe in peace and that it can be permanent; to work for peace and to strive to keep it when at last we get it. That is our duty. To prepare this nation vigorously, fully, against war, so that no nation may think of attacking us—that is our duty. And, blessed as we are among the nations, in peace, in prosperity, in safety, let us give generously to the less fortunate, and prove ourselves worthy of peace and its

blessings. That is, above all, our duty."

—*New York Times, October 20, 1915.*

*Mr. Ford condemns War, blames Capitalism.*

Asked if he did not believe that the sentiment for preparedness was spreading throughout the country, Mr. Ford admitted that it was, but insisted that it was "transitory and doomed to ultimate abandonment."

"This growing cry, this cringing wail for preparedness is one of the most dastardly influences ever at work in this nation," he said. "It is a snake that every clean, decent-thinking man should fight with every ounce of strength there is in him.

"Do you want to know the cause of war—the cause of murder in Europe,

the cause that will bring war to America if it ever comes? It is capitalism, greed, the dirty hunger for dollars. Take away the capitalist and you will sweep war from the earth. Take it away to-day and the war in Europe will stop to-morrow. Take it away and the world will have seen the end of barbarism."

"Isn't that rather an inconsistent sentiment for you to express?" he was asked. "Aren't you yourself a millionaire, a man whose wealth dominates other men; in short, a capitalist?"

He smiled broadly, and then broke into a laugh.

"My dear sir, the difference between me and a capitalist is that I earn my living honestly. I produce. . . ."

—*New York Times, November 15, 1915.*

*Pittsburgh Gazette-Times, Jan. 3, 1916.*

When asked what impressions he brought back from the war, Mr. Ford astonished his listeners by declaring sadly:

"I went to Europe blaming the capitalists, the bankers, the munition makers, for this war. I have come back blaming the people who are being slaughtered in the trenches. They have neglected to select the proper heads for their governments, or to help them after they have been selected. When they get a man in office they do not keep in touch with him; they don't write letters to him; they don't tell him what they want. They select people to govern them and then allow the militarists to twist these same people about for their own ends."

*Reuterdahl in the "Metropolitan."*

He has demoralized the navy by administrative delay, by ignoring or suppressing reports, by retaining in his personal possession naval war plans of paramount importance, leaving these documents unsigned for more than a year, and until finally demanded by the War College and his immediate advisers. By failure to authorize, under the discretion given by the regulations, public speaking and writing on naval topics by naval officers, he has muzzled them all. Only his own voice must be heard. Viciously, he told Admiral Fiske, the great strategist, the veteran of Manila, "You cannot even say two and two make four." Meantime, he proclaims his belief in the value of discussion, and even while claiming credit for the publication of one report of the General

Board, a report made under his own restrictions, he withholds one made out months before, and does not even admit or refer to its existence. Driven to it by the demands of Congress and the press, he finally makes it public.

*Henry Reuterdahl, "Metropolitan Magazine," December, "Arm or Surrender."*

"Our patriotism is waning and drifting away on the ebb tide of indifference, and as a nation our manhood is on the decline; national conscience we have not. No longer can an American hold up his head abroad. Our place in the world is that of a money bag. In Germany we are laughed at, despised as spineless weaklings; our money alone is feared. England thinks we are cowards, and American life a commodity

which can be paid for in cash. The French shrug their shoulders. . . ."

Invasion by a European power he regards as ridiculously easy.

"Right before our very eyes," he says, "our navy and army have deteriorated. So far, no one cares. It has been demonstrated and proved beyond argument that the American navy is not strong enough to maintain the command of the sea and uphold the Monroe Doctrine. With the American fleet swept off the sea, the enemy's invasion on our soil becomes but a matter of steamer schedule. Twice this has been done in the war games of our own fleet.

"The army cannot defend all its forts," he continues. "It has no automobiles to transport all its baggage; its shoes are for the parade ground and

will wear out under two months' marching; it has nineteen motor ambulances for its wounded. Its supply system cannot stand the strain of war, but will break down as it did during the Spanish war. It is without ammunition trains, armored automobiles, armored railroad trains, heavy mortars for field work, has ammunition but for a couple of days' battle and with less than one hour's supply for coast defense guns, and has not sufficient field artillery. The mobile army in the continental United States is but a little larger than twice the New York police force, and its reserve counts some sixteen men. It masters ten aeroplanes, all of which cannot fly. . . .

"'What are you going to do about it?' To which I answer, Trust the army, chuck politics sky high, again put

the fear of God in Congress, kill the graft of the useless army posts, do away with the bureau system, and let the fighting army run its own show, according to the lines laid down by the General Staff. They are trained for it; Congress is not. Establish a Council of National Defense so that the army may be represented on the floor of Congress and the demands and opinions of the efficient soldier may be heard throughout the land. Give it a budget system as exists in every country where defense means something.

"Military training must be general. It is no hardship to the youth of Switzerland or Australia. Why should it be to ours? On the other hand, it will make a better man of him, teach obedience, strengthen his undisci-

plined character, and there will be less use for slums and less need of reformatories. The day of the small, highly trained army is past. A small army is a useless expense—it will not prevent attack, and when attacks come, it cannot resist. War demands every unit of a nation—even down to the humblest baker. The fighting line is but the edge of the knife; the steel behind it is represented by the resources of the nation expended with fullest unity."

HERALD BUREAU,
No. 1,502 H STREET, N. W.,
WASHINGTON, D. C., Sunday.

Senator Key Pittman, of Nevada, newly chosen Democratic member of the Committee on Naval Affairs, authorizes the *Herald* to announce to-day

that his attitude toward national preparedness for war has undergone a complete change as a result of careful study of conditions which brought about the conflict now in progress in Europe.

When he came to the Senate three years ago Senator Pittman believed that all disputes could be settled by a court of arbitration, and he was therefore opposed to heavy armament for the United States. He has now come to the conclusion that "peaceful settlement of differences between nations is impossible so long as such nations are suspicious and distrustful of the motives, honor and integrity of each other."

Senator Pittman is therefore convinced that the United States should have a powerful navy to prevent war.

### IS INVOLVED COMMERCIALLY

"The United States," said Senator Pittman, "while not involved in the European war, is involved both politically and commercially by the war, and always will be so involved by great European or Asiatic wars. I believe that the prosperity of the people of the country in every walk of life and the progress of the government are absolutely dependent upon the maintenance of American principles and the protection of American citizens and American commerce in every part of the world. I have far less fear of an invasion of this country than I have of the destruction of the lives of American citizens and American commerce. I am not an advocate of a large standing army.

"It is astounding that so many of our citizens do not realize that the destruction of our foreign commerce would bring upon our country a most disastrous calamity that would extend to every industry and every walk of life. The prosperity of this country depends upon its ability to market its surplus products abroad. Deprive us of that power for one year and the factories would close, the mines shut down, the farms grow up in weeds, our vast ranges, now stocked with fattening herds of cattle and horses, would be abandoned, mortgages would be foreclosed without means to satisfy and a fifth of our population would be deprived of the means of earning a livelihood. And yet it is within the power of a foreign nation or a group of foreign nations to bring upon us such a ca-

lamity, and who can say, in the light of present events, that no nation or group of nations would have the desire to accomplish such a purpose?

"In my opinion the only way that such an eventuality would be prevented is by the United States possessing a sufficient navy to make such an act too dangerous to any foreign Power or group of Powers.

"When I came to the Senate I was a strong believer in the creation of an international tribunal for the settling of all international disputes. The principles enunciated at The Hague especially appealed to me. As principles I still believe that they are correct, but experience has conclusively demonstrated that they can only be enforced and maintained by sufficient force.

"Any tribunal of arbitration will be controlled by some combinations of Powers. Would any of the warring nations trust their disputes to a court controlled by their enemies? If so, why not trust their disputes to their enemies without a court? Would the Teutons submit the questions involved in the present war to a court controlled by the Allies, or would the Allies submit the questions to a court controlled by the Teutons? Would the United States submit the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine to a court controlled by European and Asiatic Powers? To suppose such conditions is absurd.

"Possession of a powerful navy by the United States, in my opinion, does not mean war, but means prevention of war.

"I have little patience with considera-

tions of economy when the vital question of the life and peace and happiness of our people is involved."

—*New York Herald, January 3, 1916.*